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Corporate governance has become a major research topic in modern
strategic management research. Since the concept of 'corporate governance'
emerged in the process of solving the agency problem caused by the
special relationship between 'ownership' and 'management', it has created
a wide and broad range of research areas: control mechanisms (e.g.,
agency theory and stewardship theory) based on the attitudes and
characteristics of principal governance agents and the causal relationship
with various corporate performance variables. In particular, since the
proliferation of globalization and free trade began in the late 20th century,
it has spurred the movement toward governance improvements by
increasing the necessity for individual countries and enterprises to form
their corporate governance to meet international standards.
China is no exception to this trend. As the influence of Chinese
enterprises increases, the improvement of their governance in line with
international standards has become their major challenge. The Chinese
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government finalized the "Equity Division Reform" at the end of 2006,
beginning with the amendment of the <Corporate Law> and the
<Securities Law> at a P lenary Session of the 15th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in September 1999.
As a result, the government-centered unitary structure, "ownership-management,"
has been separated, and an institutional basis close to international standards
has been established.
Therefore, we have presumed that the ‘Equity Division Reform' has a
great influence on the improvement of the governance of the listed
enterprises in China. In the study, we have focused on verifying the causal
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and firm
performance and strategic variables in Chinese enterprises after the reform.
First, in Study 1, we have explored the relationship between the
characteristics of corporate principal ‘management' agents and corporate
financial performance. We have sampled listed state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs) in China in a period of
corporate governance stabilization from 2007 to 2015. Among the corporate
governance variables, we have postulated the characteristics of the principal
‘management' agents (BOD and CEO) as independent variables to analyze
their effects on the financial performance. The earlier studies on enterprises
in China were not enough to identify the longitudinal relationship between
principal ‘management' agents in corporate governance and financial
performance. Therefore, we have made an attempt to fill the gap. In
addition, we have focused on enhancing the differentiation of research by
considering 'political connections' as one of the main characteristics of
- iii -
principal management agents and examining the causal relationship with
the dependent variable.
In Study 2, only listed state-owned enterprises in China are subject to
the study, and they are classified into the categories (state-owned share
and state-owned legal person share) with legal and institutional grounds to
identify the causal relationship between the characteristics of corporate
governance and the strategic change. In the study, the following have been
taken into account: So far, there has been very little research on the
relationship between corporate governance and strategic change in Chinese
enterprises. Even if the scope of this study is extended beyond China,
there is a need for a study on the relationship between the 'ownership'
holders and the strategic change to consider the characteristics of
'ownership' holders because the governance factors are concentrated on the
principal management agents. Among the state-owned enterprises listed on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), we have finally selected 270 firms
observable for nine years from 2007 to 2015 and have used a fixed effect
model to analyze them.
In Studies 1 and 2 mentioned above, there are the following implications.
The causal relationship of each corporate governance factor with the
corporate performance and strategies have been analyzed from the existing
contractual viewpoint. In addition, the behavioral approach to principal
governance agents and the institutional and environmental uniqueness
embraced by Chinese enterprises have been considered.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Since the reform and opening in 1978, China’s economy has achieved
remarkable growth. In this process, enterprises have been under constant
pressure for institutional and environmental change. In particular, since
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, improving their
corporate governance to meet global standards for capital market opening
and global competitiveness has become their major challenge. In late 2006,
these changes, which peaked through the "Equity Division Reform," led to
investment from other countries by providing an institutional environment
for abandoning the government-centered unified governance and forming
corporate governance that conforms to international standards. (Dong Sik
Chang, 2008). These changes in the times have also changed the major
research trends on Chinese enterprises. That is, the research tended to
focus on corporate governance factors and business performance (Xu et al.,
1999; Xu & Wang, 1999; Qi et al., 2000, Wei et al., 2005) based on agency
theory before the reform. However, its theoretical domain has expanded
into the following fields: sociological and psychological theories propounded
to interpret changed corporate governance, extended interpretation of
governance factors and main governance agents, and exploration of
outcome variables influenced by governance factors.
However, despite the changes in the theoretical field, there are still
various limitations in the studies on corporate governance after the reform.
Therefore, there are the following representative arguments: There is a
- 2 -
need for a solid longitudinal study on corporate governance and corporate
performance (Li & Zhang, 2010), and there is a need for a study reflecting
the independent socialist system (See, 2009). In addition, studies on the
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance
variables have mainly focused on certain principal agents (Dan Liu․
Choelsoon Park․Sangsuk Lee, 2016), and there is a need for an extensive
study on the various outcome variables which can be influenced by
governance factors. (Marquis & Qian, 2014).
In this study, we have attempted to fill the academic gap raised, to
suggest the variables reflecting the environmental uniqueness in China, and
to classify the corporate groups. In Study 1, we have examined the
relationship between corporate governance factors and corporate financial
performance in the cases of listed state-owned and private-owned
enterprises in China from 2007 to 2015. We have focused on the
relationship between principal ‘management' agents and the business
performance, which has been relatively insufficient in the study of the
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance in
China. In addition, we have postulated the 'political connection' of principal
‘management' agents as a variable considering the environmental
uniqueness in China, and we have interpreted it from a behavioral and
structural viewpoint to formulate hypotheses. In this process, the ownership
type is used to define state-owned enterprises or private-owned enterprises
from an operational aspect. and its moderation effect is checked.
In Study 2, we have focused on identifying the causal relationship
between each corporate governance factor and strategic change. As
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globalization and the development of information technology (IT) accelerate
changes in the industrial environment, corporate strategy is attracting
attention as a major factor for the survival and prosperity of enterprises.
However, there have not been enough studies on Chinese enterprises.
Therefore, we have set up and verified research models considering these
points. In this case, it is important to note that the research subject is
limited to state-owned enterprises typed to examine the moderation effect
between each independent variable and the dependent variable. The
assumption here is that the directions and purposes pursued by the types
of state-owned enterprises are different. In this approach, we have
extended the scope of research, which has been focused on principal
‘management' agents to 'ownership' holders in the study of the
relationship between corporate governance and strategic change. As a
result, it would be an opportunity not only to understand the causal
relationship between the overall governance factors in China and corporate
strategic change but also to reveal the collective characteristics of the
state-owned shares and state-owned legal person shares which have not
been specifically verified in previous studies on state-owned enterprises.
Here state-owned enterprises can be regarded as the core and root of the
independent socialist economic system.
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Study1: The Impact of Corporate




This study aims to investigate the effect of the corporate ownership type
on the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance.
Therefore, in this paper, we have conducted an empirical analysis of
Chinese enterprises under increasing institutional and environmental
pressure due to China’s accession to the WTO in the late 1990s and the
"Equity Division Reform" at the end of 2006. Among the enterprises listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), 405 enterprises observable for nine
years from 2007 to 2015 have been sampled and analyzed with a fixed
effect model. In the empirical analysis, the characteristics of BOD and
CEO, which can be considered to be principal ‘management' agents among
the corporate governance variables, are postulated as an independent
variable. We have studied the causal relationship of the following factors
with corporate financial performance: the ratio of outside directors in the
BOD, the ratio of directors with political connections in the BOD, the
CEO‘s tenure and the CEO’s political connection. In addition, the ownership
type distinguishing between a state-owned enterprise and a private-owned
enterprise is postulated as an independent variable. This factor is used to
verify their interaction effect on the causal relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variable. The results of the
empirical analysis are as follows. Given the four independent variables
proposed in this study, all factors except for the BOD’s political connection
have a significant relationship with corporate financial performance. In
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addition, it could be found that the interaction effect of the ownership type
in the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance
have a significant moderation effect on all hypotheses except for the
hypothesis related to the BOD’s political connection. Here the corporate
governance is based on the environmental uniqueness in China and the
rationale. These results have the following meaningful implications: we
have made a longitudinal study on the significance between the
characteristics of principal ‘management' agents and the financial
performance, which have not shown consistency in the study of enterprises
in China with its own independent political and economic systems. In the
study of Chinese enterprises, the political connections of principal
‘management' agents and the corporate ownership type can be considered
as important variables.
Keywords: Corporate Governance in China, Ratio of Outside Directors
in the BOD, CEO's Tenure, Political Connection, Corporate Ownership




Corporate governance is still a major part of modern strategic
management research. Since Berle and Means (1932) asserted the
separation of 'ownership' and 'management', it has developed into
theoretical studies based on agency theory from a contractual perspective
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Even until now, its domain has continued to expand in the study of its
internal and external control mechanisms, various leading factors and the
relationship with corporate performance variables.
Corporate governance can be broadly defined as the dynamics among
corporate stakeholders (management executives including block holders, and
minority shareholders, creditors, employees, etc) that influence
decision-making in business management. It can be narrowly defined as a
monitoring and controlling system in which corporate executives can fulfill
their roles for the interests of stakeholders such as shareholders. It can be
understood as a concept emerging from the process of solving the agency
problem caused by the special relationship between ownership and
management. Thus, an enterprise with good corporate governance can
minimize the agency problem so that it can attain efficient and effective
management and have a system in which the benefits of various
stakeholders can be maximized (Dong Sik Chang, 2008). Therefore, national
measures have been developed to establish rational corporate governance in
the western developed countries, where capital markets have been
liberalized and systematic legal systems have been established. The OECD
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has played a leading role in establishing international norms for corporate
governance, which is still a major concern in the field of practice.
This trend is no exception to the Chinese market, which has achieved
rapid economic growth since its reform and opening in 1978. The 15th
Central Committee of the CPC, held in September 1999, designated
corporate governance as the core of the modern corporate system, and the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has led the amendment of
the <Corporate Law> and the <Securities Law>, the two main laws of the
securities market, in order to improve corporate governance. Improving
corporate governance in China was a key demand of the international
community including developed countries for China’s accession to the WTO.
China has gone through the process of gradual improvement since its
accession to the WTO in 2001. At the end of 2006, China eventually laid
the groundwork for its corporate governance-related system close to
international standards through the ‘Equity Division Reform.’ In other
words, the reform plan, called the “Difference of the Stockholder's Rights,”
has led other countries advocating a market economy to their active
investment in Chinese enterprises by separating ownership and
management to deviate from the former government-centered unitary
structure of ownership and management in China, which claims to have its
own socialist economic system (Dong Sik Chang, 2008). This can be
compatible with the management environment in which Korean enterprises
have undergone dramatic changes in corporate governance through major
restructuring and the enactment of related laws since the financial crisis
mentioned by Park & Kim (2008).
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Therefore, this case has also changed the trend of research on the
corporate governance of listed enterprises in China. Before the reform,
there were studies on the governance factors and business performance of
listed enterprises in China, including the business performance of
private-owned and state-owned enterprises in China (Xu & Wang, 1999;
Myeong Kee Chung, 2006), the ratio of state-owned shares and the
business performance (Xu & Wang, 1999; Qi et al., 2000; Cho․Li, 2006),
the ownership structure and the corporate performance (Qi et al., 2000),
and enterprise value (Wei et al., 2005). However, these studies have the
following limitations: they did not include institutional changes related to
the reform of corporate governance, and the scope of research on corporate
governance was concentrated on 'ownership' holders. Since there are only
short-term collected data related to studies after the reform, there is a
need for a solid longitudinal study on the relationship with business
performance (Li & Zhang, 2010). The claim that the study should reflect
the uniqueness of China's own socialist system (See, 2009) is also
convincing. Moreover, as suggested by Sun Hyun Park (2015), there is a
need for studies on corporate governance to take a behavioral approach
based on sociological and psychological aspects beyond the contractual
viewpoint. It is necessary to study the relationship between the corporate
governance and business performance of Chinese enterprises by considering
such points in a balanced way. In this study, given the listed state-owned
and private-owned enterprises in China from 2007 to 2015 when corporate
governance has been stabilized since the reform of the Difference of the
Stockholder's Rights, we have tried to identify the relationship between
- 10 -
their corporate governance factors and their financial performance.
It is expected that this study can make some theoretical contributions as
well as fill the academic gap in the study of Chinese enterprises mentioned
above regarding the relationship between their corporate governance and
their financial performance. First, we focus on the relationship between the
'management' agents and the management performance by extending the
scope of research which has been focused on the ownership structure in
the study of corporate governance and financial performance in China. As
discussed above, the majority of previous studies on the relationship
between corporate governance and financial performance of Chinese
enterprises focused on the causal relationship between ownership holders
and financial performance, such as the ownership structure of the largest
shareholder and block holders, ratio of foreign investors' shareholdings and
ownership concentration (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Hill & Snell, 1989;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Qi et al., 2000; Gunasekarage et al., 2007). On the
other hand, there was a relative lack of research on the causal relationship
between the characteristics of principal corporate decision makers (CEO
and BOD) and the corporate performance. This was because the principal
‘management' agents could not play an important role in corporate
management under the following conditions: they could not be free from
the influence of the government due to the unified structure of the
ownership and management of Chinese enterprises before the reform of the
“Difference of the Stockholder's Rights,” and their discretion was also
relatively limited (Dong Sik Chang, 2008). However, since the reform in
2006, majority of Chinese companies have separated ownership and
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management and each of these functions has been actively controlled and
interacted. Due to the Asian financial crisis hit after that, the importance of
executives’ decision-making to cope with environmental change has become
an issue. Therefore, in this study, we have observed the causal relationship
between the characteristics of executives and the management performance
in this context.
Second, to define the characteristics of principal ‘management' agents, it
is necessary to use variables considering China's environmental uniqueness.
Since China has its own political and economic system, enterprises in
China also have institutional embeddedness different from those in other
countries. As the assertion made by Liu et al. (2016), principal
‘management' agents in Chinese enterprises have a dual position (the
position in their corporate organizations and the political position in the
Communist Party) and that it is called 'political connection'. This
characteristic can be interpreted from a behavioral and structural viewpoint
because it can ultimately affect the relationship between the CEO and the
BOD, their relative power and their social influence. Therefore, in this
study, we have postulated the political connection of the BOD and the
political connection of the CEO as a variable considering the political
connection to check the relationship with the financial performance.
Finally, in this study, we have used the ownership type as a moderating
variable, which classifies enterprises into state-owned enterprises and
private-owned enterprises, to examine the interaction effect of the
characteristics of principal management agents on the financial performance.
Myeong Kee Chung (2006) proved that private-owned enterprises have
- 12 -
higher business performance than state-owned enterprises among listed
enterprises in China. This can be interpreted as a result of the different
organizational goals and strategies pursued by each corporate group and
their reflection on its business performance. By the same logic, we have
analyzed panel data collected for nine years from 2007 to 2015 to verify the
interaction effect depending on the ownership type. This is an attempt to
see whether there is a difference in financial performance depending on the
group characteristics even in an institutionally stabilized situation which
has been improved since the reform.
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Ⅱ. Theoretical Background
2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance and its
Relationship with the financial performance
In the early stages of the research, corporate governance was defined as
a mechanism that could minimize the agent cost and transaction cost
between stakeholders to maximize enterprise value (Williamson, 1985).
However, its concept has been gradually expanded into systems governing
laws, rules and factors which are used to control corporate operations
(Gillan & Starks, 1998). In recent years, the research has focused on
management activities caused by ownership and management structure
rather than discussion on corporate governance itself (Seong-Keun Choi,
2006), thereby enhancing investor confidence and enterprises’ economic
efficiency. As these activities emerge as the engine that can ultimately
drive business growth, their importance is being emphasized (OECD, 2004).
The start of discussions on 'ownership' and principal 'management'
agents, which are regarded as the key to research on corporate
governance, is based on agent theory claimed by Jensen & Meckling
(1976). This becomes the logic in spreading the awareness that it is
necessary to minimize agency costs (bonding costs, monitoring costs,
residual losses, etc.) caused by the inconsistency of interests in the
delegation relationship between the shareholders (the principal of an
enterprise) and the CEO (the agent) and to have an efficient management
- 14 -
system. Therefore, there have been constant discussions about studies on
the causal relationship of subdivided principal agents affecting the efficiency
of corporate governance with variables such as corporate performance and
strategies (e.g. Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Johnson & Greening, 1999).
Here subdivided principal agents include chief executive officer (CEO),
board of directors (BOD), top management team (TMT), inside directors,
the largest shareholder, outside directors, and foreign or institutional
investors.
In particular, there have been active discussions about the relationship
between corporate financial performance and corporate governance
regarding the characteristics of BOD (e.g., Balack & Claessens, 2007;
Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Bruno & Classens, 2010; Liu et al., 2015, Rashid
et al., 2010;, Garg, 2007; Hu et al., 2010) and the characteristics of CEO
(e.g., Miller, 1991, Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; McClelland, Barket & Oh,
2012; Tsai et al., 2006), and ownership structure (e.g., Dong & Gou, 2010;
Joh, 2003; Mak & Kusnadi, 2002; Morck & Vishiny, 1988; Xia and Walker,
2015; Ki Sung Park, 2002; Choi․Ham․Kim, 2003). However, an accepted
agreement has yet to be reached. Therefore, the argument that the
relationship between the two things is determined by situational factors is
becoming convincing, and various studies have been carried out in
consideration of these.
This trend is no exception to the study of Chinese enterprises in terms
of the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance.
There have been studies on the correlation between governance factors
(ownership type (Xu et al., 1999)), ratio of state-owned shareholdings
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(2006), ownership structure (Qi et al., 2000) and financial performance.
However, many of these studies are limited to enterprises before 2006 in
which they began to meet international standards in ownership and
management structure (Dong Sik Chang, 2008). In addition, studies after
the 'Equity Division Reform' have not considered the environmental
uniqueness that can affect the relationship between variables (See, 2009;
Liu et al., 2016), and there is a need for a sold longitudinal study because
the period of accumulated research data is too short (Li & Zhang, 2010).
Therefore, there is a need for a study overcoming these limitations. In
response to this, two factors affecting corporate governance are reflected in
the study.
2.2 Uniqueness of Corporate Governance in China
2.2.1 Political Connection
In order to understand enterprise activities in China properly, a
background understanding of environmental uniqueness needs to be
preceded. This means that the institutional environment to which each
corporate group belongs is different needs to be taken into consideration in
the study of China as well.
Chinese enterprises’ typical characteristic in corporate governance is that
stakeholders involved in corporate 'management' can have a dual position
enabling them to belong to both the government and the enterprise. The
- 16 -
government policies, regulations and enforcement are the major external
environmental factors that influence corporate management (Hillman,
Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999; Mahon & Murray, 1981; Marsh, 1998; Shaffer,
1995). Among the CEO and members of BOD, those with political party
status have direct interests with the government. Thus, they not only
serve as a link between the government and the enterprise but also act as
the catalyst for the diffusion of government policy. As a result, the
embedded political and institutional factors of the Chinese government have
enabled a system that can affect individual enterprises (Haveman et al.,
2016).
Jia (2014) conducted a study of private-owned enterprises in China by
dividing their political activities into individual and collective levels. Here
the individual-level political activities are in line with the concept of the
political connection defined by Li et al. (2006, 2008). They are those who
not only act as decision makers in the enterprise but also play political
roles such as a government official (mayor or vice-governor), a member of
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a member
of the National People's Congress (NPC), etc. Therefore, it is necessary to
have a clear understanding of the following: the relationship with the
government can vary according to their given situation, and the relative
strength of the relationship with the government can also change.
The studies on political connections in other countries, except China,
define the characteristics of political connections, including research
subjects’ social experiences (Yu & Lee, 2016) and their attitudes toward
political parties supported (Goldman, Rocholl & So, 2008). On the other
- 17 -
hand, the political connections of Chinese enterprises indicate the following
difference that research subjects have a direct relationship with the
government and their position can be changed according to their situations.
Therefore, it is necessary to comprehensively consider the power and
relationship of those who have such a position in the study of corporate
governance in China beyond the simple contractual viewpoint.
Many earlier studies on the political connections of principal management
agents have focused on their positive effects such as increasing stability
regarding regulations (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001), enhancing access to
external resources (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006), increasing
enterprise value (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Ramalho, 2007), and
enhancing corporate performance ultimately (Johnson & Mitton, 2003).
However, their negative effects (e.g., power abuse, lack of communication,
and rigid organizational culture) have also emerged as other research topics
in recent years (Cheung et al. 2010; Chen et al., 2011b; Fan et al., 2007;
Wu et al., 2012).
Therefore, in this study, we have considered the clear difference between
the political connection defined in the study of Chinese enterprises and that
used in the study of other countries to identify the effect of each principal
management agent’s political connection on corporate financial performance.
2.2.2 Characteristics of Corporate Groups
One of the distinctive characteristics to be considered in the study of
Chinese enterprises is the collective characteristics that appear according to
- 18 -
their ownership types. The People's Republic of China, founded on the
basis of socialist ideology, had only state-owned enterprises of all types in
the early days of its founding (Dong Sik Chang, 2008). However, since its
reform and opening in 1978, private-owned firms have emerged and the
characteristics of these groups have been divided. According to the
National Bureau of Statistics of China, the number of private firms (only
including non-listed enterprises in manufacturing industries) has rapidly
increased since its reform and opening. Thus, by 2015, there were 216,506
private-owned enterprises, representing 11.2 times as many as 19,273
state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the total assets of state-owned
enterprises are about 397,403 billion yuan, which is 1.7 times as much as
that of the private-owned enterprises, with about 229,006 million yuan1).
That is, there are absolutely many private-owned enterprises in terms of
the number of enterprises, but the state-owned firm group has more
stability in terms of management performance and asset size.
These characteristics can be reconfirmed if only the status of listed
enterprises is considered. Li & Zhang (2010) said that the state-owned
enterprises accounted for 63.15% of listed enterprises in China as of 2007.
This result is significantly different from the results observed in the UK
(1.4%), Germany (0.08%) and Japan (6.3%) during the same period, and the
result is also higher than that of Singapore (23.50%), where the ratio of
state-owned enterprises is relatively high. For this reason, listed enterprises
and state-owned enterprises, which are considered to have performance,
structural and institutional stability, have been the main research subjects
1) China Statistical Yearbook, 2006-2015
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in business management studies in China.
On the one hand, the state-owned firm group and the private-owned
firm group have organizational and historical differences in China. Until the
reform and opening in 1978, the public enterprises (or state-owned
enterprises) were the only corporate establishment structure. However, in
1978, there was an attempt to isolate the property and management of the
state-owned enterprises through the experiment of expanding the
independence of enterprises. From that time, the state-owned firms have
attempted to change into a group pursuing their business performance
beyond the meaning of public interest-oriented organizations. The
introduction of the economic responsibility system from 1981 to 1982 and
the reform of the taxation of profits in 1983 led to the completion of a
system in which state-owned enterprises’ revenue generation led to the
growth of national financial revenues. After that, the generalization of
management contract liability between 1989 and 1992 transformed into a
structure that enhanced the productivity of enterprises by breaking the
average distribution policy. From 1992 to 1997, state-owned enterprises
attempted to gradually change into modern enterprises through their
reforms. In 2006, the state-owned enterprise structure in which ownership
and management were separated was completed through the reform of the
Difference of the Stockholder's Rights (Shu, 2012). In summary, the
characteristics of state-owned enterprises, which had been under the direct
management of the government, changed through the mitigation of
government control, the separation of corporate governance and the pursuit
of profit.
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On the other hand, the private-owned firm group has paid attention to
the recovery and development of the individual economy since the reform
and opening. It was incorporated into the legal trajectory in 1988 when the
State Councils passed the <Ordinance for Incorporation of Private-Owned
Firm Act>. The private-owned enterprises, which had made little progress
compared to the state-owned enterprises, began to grow in earnest in 1995
when the government began to sell small or improperly-run state-owned
enterprises to individuals for the purpose of reforming state-owned
enterprises (Lin et al., 2001). From this point on, there has been an
economic structure in which the large-scale state-owned enterprises are
directly operated by the government and the rest of the firms are entrusted
to individuals. This change eventually became the basis for establishing the
<Sole Proprietorships Law> on Jan. 1, 2000. Finally, in May 2004,
individual entrepreneurs whose personal assets and capital were protected
by the National Constitution became free to establish and operate their own
businesses for the purpose of revenue maximization (Ralston et al., 2006).
Thus, the state-owned and private-owned firm groups in China have
differentiated characteristics in the process of development and
institutionalization. There has been a shift towards greater autonomy for
market participants than in the past; nonetheless, there is a clear
distinction between groups regarding the characteristics of governance and
the organizational purposes. Therefore, in this paper, these characteristics of
each corporate group are defined as another distinct characteristic of
Chinese enterprises and applied to the research.
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Ⅲ. Hypotheses
3.1 Principal ’Management’ Agents and Financial Performance
3.1.1 Board of Directors (BOD) and Financial Performance
In this study, we have suggested outside directors as one of principal
management agents of corporate governance. Outside directors can be
factors influencing various BOD roles as a part of the BOD, the highest
decision-making body in the enterprise, and they can function as a key
mechanism for corporate governance, such as resolving agency problems
and maximizing shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pearce &
Zahra, 1992). This is because of the following reason. Unlike inside
directors directly involved in corporate influence due to their direct
employment relationships, outside directors are characterized by
independence from the enterprise or executives because of their different
contractual relationships (Johnson et al., 1996). In general, the functions of
outside directors are divided into three kinds of roles and functions: control,
service, and resource dependence. The control function means the role of
outside directors on behalf of shareholders to prevent management
(including the CEO) from violating shareholder interests (Baysinger &
Butler, 1985; Baysinger & Hoskission, 1990; 1994b; Fama & Jensen, 1983;
Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Lorsch & MacIvor, 1989; Monks & Minow,
1995; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). The service function means the role of
outside directors to actively participate in establishing a corporate strategy
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and offering advice on general management activities (Lorsch & Maclvor,
1989). Finally, the resource dependence function means the role of outside
directors to facilitate the acquisition of resources that are essential for
corporate survival and growth, using networks with other organizations
(Boyd, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer,
1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Among these
functions, the control function is based on the agency theory, and the
service and resource dependence functions are based on the resource
dependence theory (Gales & Kesner, 1994; Liu & Lee, 2016; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Gyeonghwan Lee·Jeongil Seo, 2015). In China, since the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the "Guidance on
the Construction of the Independent Director System of a Listed
Enterprise" in August 2001, each listed enterprise should appoint one third
or more of the BOD members as outside directors on the basis of the
guidance, and at least one of the outside directors should be appointed as
an accounting specialist.
On the other hand, there is some room to argue about the causal
relationship between the effect of outside directors and the financial
performance of the enterprise due to the following reasons. Some studies
showed that outside directors increased the efficiency of corporate
governance by controlling arbitrary management and ultimately had a
positive (+) effect on the financial performance (Balack & Claessens, 2007;
Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Bruno & Classens, 2010; Liu et al., 2015). In
contrast, others showed that there was no significant difference in the
relationship between the effect of outside directors and the financial
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performance (Rashid et al., 2010; Garg, 2007; Hu et al. 2010). However,
one-year cross-sectional data were used in the study conducted by Rashid
et al. (2010). In the study of Hu et al. (2010), it could be predicted that the
effect of outside directors would not be verified due to the ownership
concentration of block holders. Outside directors tended to focus on the
economic responsibilities of the enterprise (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995). As
a result of the above studies, the higher the ratio of outside directors in
the BOD becomes, the more likely it is that their control function will help
form the corporate governance effectively. In addition, they can be used for
corporate service and resource functions, and it can be expected that they
can have a positive effect on the financial performance. Therefore, the
following hypothesis can be derived.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the ratio of outside directors in the
BOD becomes, the higher the financial performance of the
enterprise gets.
The ‘Board of Directors (BOD)’ represents the shareholders as a principal
management agent of an enterprise. The BOD is the highest
decision-making body with the following powers as an institutional
apparatus for checking and supervising the executives: approval of major
strategies and investments of the enterprise, protection of assets in the
enterprise, appointment and dismissal of the executives including the CEO,
and evaluation of management performance (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). The
BOD functions as a core mechanism of corporate governance (Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). The BOD also plays the following
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roles: control, service, and resource dependence (Johnson et al., 1996). In
recent years, there is a growing emphasis on the role of actively
responding to the environment as various control measures for corporate
governance are developed, such as strengthening shareholder activism
(Golden & Zajac, 2001; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Jeong · Moon · Kim,
2016). In particular, in China, there is a social atmosphere in which the role
of the BOD is emphasized as a means to check the excessive influence of
the CEO in the enterprise (See, 2009). As stated in the Theoretical
Background section, there are a large number of directors with dual
positions related to the enterprise and the government, regardless of
whether they are outside directors or outside directors. Therefore, their
political connections, relative power relations and social capital can directly
or indirectly influence the performance of the enterprise.
In the upper echelon theory, an individual's experience affects his/her
propensity and values and ultimately generates a bias that influences
his/her final decision-making. (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007).
If this theory is applied to a Chinese enterprise’s BOD members with
political connections, their personal values are likely to influence corporate
decision-making (Liu et al., 2016). The effect of the BOD’s political
connection can be explained in more detail through the resource dependence
theory. In other words, the BOD plays a role in absorbing and stabilizing
major environmental uncertainties in the enterprise (Boyd, 1990; Hillman,
Cannella, & Peatzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). In this way, it can enhance
corporate survival and corporate performance (Singh, House, & Tucker,
1986).
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The effect of the BOD members with political connections on various
corporate management activities and performance has been actively studied
in China (e.g., Cull & Xu, 2005; Chizema et al, 2015; Faccio, 2006; Faccio,
2010; Hillman, 2005; Johnson & Mitton, 2003), but these studies are still
unable to draw a coherent consensus on their effectiveness. However, in
this study, we have focused on the fact that there is a social atmosphere
in which the BODs of Chinese enterprises should play a role in checking
the excessive power concentration of the CEOs. The political connections of
BOD members can help stabilize their organization from the government's
policy, regulation, and enforcement (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001). It has been
assumed that they are possible to increase the accessibility of external
resources (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006), to increase the enterprise
value (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Ramalho, 2007), and to improve
performance eventually (Johnson & Mitton, 2003). In addition, we have
assumed the following possibilities. They can raise the efficiency of
corporate governance within their organization by controlling and
monitoring the power that may be concentrated mainly on the block
holders or CEO. In the end, they can be used as a strategic asset to
enhance organizational performance (Hillman, 2005; Siegel, 2007). Therefore,
the following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of the discussion.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the ratio of BOD members with political
connections becomes, the higher the financial performance of the
enterprise gets.
3.1.2 CEO and Financial Performance
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Another corporate governance-related principal management agent
proposed in this study is the 'Chief Executive Officer (CEO)'. A CEO is of
great interest not only as an object of surveillance and control in corporate
governance but also as an important doer in maximizing shareholder value
(Jong-Hun Park․Yun-Dal Sung․Mu-Goan Jeong, 2010). The CEO also
acts as a key decision-maker (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Andrews, 1971;
Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg, 1973; Selznick, 1957; Thompson, 1967) with
overall responsibility for management activities and performance. The CEO
has been a major concern of business administration in the study of
corporate governance since He/she represents the executives within his/her
organization.
There are various related research areas such as internal․external
control mechanisms to prevent the CEO’s self-interest pursuit and to
control the CEO’s inefficient management activities (Agrawal & Knoeber,
1996; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Peng, 2004; Walsh & Seward, 1990; Wagner
III et al., 1998; Dong Ryung Shin, 2003; Seonghoon Kim․Choelsoon Park,
2000; Joo Tae Kim, 2007), the CEO replacement (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Hambrick, 1989; Lafuenta & Salas, 1989; Jee Hyun Park․Yang Min, Kim,
2010) and effect (Brady & Helmich, 1984; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Dalton &
Dalton, 2005) and the CEO’s tenure (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Musteen,
Barket & Baeten, 2006; McClelland, Barket & Oh, 2012; Wu, Levitas &
Priem, 2005). We have identified relationships with various variables using
the agency theory, the upper echelon theory and the organization politics
theory (Jong-Hun Park․Yun-Dal Sung․Mu-Goan Jeong, 2010). One of
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the noteworthy points is as follows. In the past, the CEO's role tended to
be analyzed from a structural viewpoint of ownership and management
based on the contractual aspects. On the other hand, in recent years, there
are active studies considering the CEO’s environment and personal
characteristics as the assertion made by Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991).
In this study, we have postulated the characteristics of a CEO as the
“CEO’s　tenure” based on contractual aspects and the 'CEO with political
connections' based on behavioral aspects to identify the causal relationship
with the financial performance. First, the CEO’s tenure is a reliable variable
that shows the demographic characteristics of the CEO (Choelsoon Park,
Jin Tak Yoo, 1999), which can have a significant impact on the financial
performance of the enterprise. The fact that the CEO has not been replaced
or has succeeded in succession can be taken as a signal that he has not
lost his/her trust in the overall management of the enterprise from
principal agents (e.g. block holders and BOD) monitoring and controlling
him/her. The above fact can also be regarded as an act of informing the
outside parties of the corporate stability since the CEO has more symbolic
significance than an individual in the organization (Brady & Helmich, 1984).
Discussions on the CEO’s tenure cover its various affecting areas,
including corporate governance and strategy (Miller, 1991), innovation (Wu,
Levitas & Priem, 2005), board composition (Cook & Burress, 2013)
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; McClelland, Barket & Oh, 2012; Tsai et al.,
2006), R & D investment (Chen, 2013), etc. There are also various areas
related to corporate financial performance (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991;
McClelland, Barket & Oh, 2012; Tsai et al., 2006). In particular, Hambrick
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& Fukutomi (1991) suggested the proposition that the relationship between
the CEO’s tenure and corporate performance would show an inverted
U-shape rather than a linear regression relationship. After that, the
following assumption is gaining momentum: the CEO’s tenure will have a
negative (-) relationship with corporate performance as the tenure gets
longer (McClelland, Barket & Oh, 2012; Kroll et al., 2000; Miller, 1990,
1993). However, there is still no consensus. This is no exception to the
CEOs of Chinese enterprises that have separated ownership and
management since the reform of the Difference of the Stockholder's Rights.
It is possible to infer the following situation. As the CEO’s tenure gets
longer, the motivation for growth and development (Audia et al., 2000;
Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) and the commitment to learning fall
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). It is possible to infer that it will
ultimately have a negative impact on the enterprise’ financial performance.
Therefore, the following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this
logic.
Hypothesis 3: The longer the CEO's tenure becomes, the lower
the financial performance of the enterprise gets.
The 'political connection of the CEO', which is assumed to be another
CEO's characteristic, is a variable considering the 'dual position' that
principal management agents mentioned above can have in China. The
research on the political connection focuses on executives’ specific social
background and relationship, social capital and network. On the other hand,
a dual position is different in that it enjoys not only the position of a
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member of the Communist Party, which advocates an independent socialist
line, but also the position of the executive in the enterprise. For example,
Yu & Lee (2016) defined the CEOs' experience in officialdom as their
political connections in the case of state-owned enterprises in Korea, and
examined the effects of these political connections on financial support
acquisition and financial performance. Goldman, Rocholl & So (2008)
defined the relationship with a BOD member, who had a network with the
victorious political party in the US presidential election, as his/her political
connection and analyzed the effect of the political connection on the stock
price of his/her enterprise. It can be said that this is a clear distinction
from the study of Chinese enterprises regarding political connections.
CEOs are generally considered to take overall responsibility (Finkelstein
et al., 2009; Andrews, 1971; Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg, 1973; Selznick, 1957;
Thompson, 1967) for management activities and performance with symbolic
significance (Brady & Helmich, 1984) within their organizations. Therefore,
there remains room for debate over their political connections. That is, the
roles related to organizational stabilization (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001) and
resource dependence (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006) can be raised
like the positive effects of the political connections of the BOD, and there
may be negative effects of their power abuse (Cheung et al., 2010; Chen et
al., 2011b; Wu et al., 2012).
In this study, it has been pointed out that there is an atmosphere of
restraining the power concentration of the CEOs of the Communist
Party-oriented enterprises in the environment of Chinese enterprises with
government-led environmental uniqueness (See, 2009). We have come to
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the conclusion that the political connections of CEOs will eventually have a
negative effect on the financial performance. The reason for this logic is as
follows. If a CEO who has a symbolic significance beyond an individual
has a special relationship with the government, his commitment to the
enterprise’s performance will be reduced due to his/her dual position (See,
2009). Excessive power concentrated in the CEO can result in the CEO's
arbitrary action since the function of the block holders and BOD that
control the CEO’s power becomes subordinate to the CEO (Pearce and
Zahra, 1991). In the end, performance will be degraded. The following
hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this logic.
Hypothesis 4: The CEO’s political connection will reduce
corporate financial performance.
3.2 Ownership Types and Interaction Effect
3.2.1 Ownership Types and Financial Performance
Ownership has been expanded into the following research areas: the core
of research on corporate governance and corporate ownership holders, their
shareholdings, the various ownership-based relations and management
strategy. This implies that these broad research areas deal with the
ownership structure and the ownership type. The ownership structure is
related to the mutual relations arising from the ownership and
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concentration of corporate ownership holders. The ownership type is related
to the characteristics of groups categorized through the categorization of
the major block holders’ ownership characteristics such as firm size, firm
ownership type (state-owned enterprise or private-owned enterprise) and
family business status.
There have been many active studies on the causal relationship between
ownership and management performance and value in the field of finance
and management strategy as follows. There have been studies on the
relationship of the ownership structure and concentration with the financial
performance and enterprise value. Here the ownership structure and
concentration has to do with CEOs, block holders, institutional investors
and foreign investors (Dong & Gou, 2010; Joh, 2003; Mak & Kusnadi, 2002;
Morck & Vishiny, 1988; Xia and Walker, 2015; Ki Sung Park , 2002; Jeong
Pyo Choi․Ki Chang Ham․Hee Tak Kim, 2003). There are also studies on
the causal relationship of the ownership type with the financial performance
and enterprise value. Here the ownership type has to do with the
conglomerate status (Kyung-Seo Park․Jae Seung Park, 2001) and the
state-owned․private-owned enterprise status (Li & Zhang, 2010; Wei et
al., 2005).
In this study, we have classified listed Chinese enterprises into
state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises to study the
relationship between the ownership type and financial performance. The
background of setting up such research models is as follows. As of 2007
the state-owned enterprises accounted for 63.15% of total listed enterprises
in China. Therefore, there is a marked difference compared to Britain
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(1.4%), Germany (0.08%) and Japan (6.3%) as well as Singapore (23.50%),
known for a high ratio of state-owned enterprises (Li & Zhang, 2010).
Since the current situation is not so different, it is assumed that the
collective tendencies of state-owned and private-owned enterprises in China
may be different from those of enterprises in other countries. In addition,
as stated above, state-owned and private-owned enterprises in China have
undergone different birth backgrounds and legal development processes in
their own socialist economic system. In order to identify the causal
relationship between the ownership type and the financial performance, it is
reasonable to distinguish between state-owned enterprises and
private-owned enterprises.
There have been studies on listed Chinese enterprises as follows. There
have been studies examining the relationship between performance and
state-owned enterprises only (Hu, et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2016; Xiong, Li &
Wang, 2008). There have also been studies comparing the management
performance by distinguishing state-owned enterprises and private-owned
enterprises in terms of the ownership type (Wei et al., 2005; Xu & Wang,
1999; Yu & Zheng, 2014). It is generally accepted that state-owned
enterprises have lower financial performance than private-owned enterprises
aiming at revenue maximization (Wei et al., 2005; Yu & Zheng, 2014; Song,
Wang & Cavusgil, 2014) due to their organizational nature of pursuing both
public interest and profits (Aharoni, 1981; Dong Sik Chang, 2008).
Therefore, the following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this
logic.
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Hypothesis 5: The private-owned firm group will have higher
financial performance than the state-owned firm group.
3.2.2 Interaction Effect and Financial Performance
In this study, we have postulated the ownership type as a variable that
moderates the relationship between the independent variables and the
dependent variable. Here, independent variables are related to the
characteristics of principal ‘management' agents in corporate governance.
This is based on the following reasons. The characteristics of the BOD
and that of the CEO have a significant relationship with the financial
performance of the enterprise, and the relationship may be different
depending on the state-owned․private-owned enterprise status. The logic
in the interaction effect of each independent variable and moderating
variable is as follows.
First, outside directors tend to play the following roles: service and
resource (Fama, 1980; Monks & Minow, 1995) while also functioning as
surveillance and control within the enterprise, and they tend to focus on
the economic responsibility of the enterprise (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995). In
particular, in the past, the function of monitoring and control was
emphasized in the ownership structure. Recently, they are likely to have a
positive (+) causal relationship with an enterprise's financial performance
by playing a role in the provision of new services and resources within
their organizations on the basis of resource dependent theory (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). However, as the assertion made by Li & Zhang (2010),
these effects may vary with organizational suitability. Since the
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characteristics of governance and executives in listed Chinese public-owned
and private-owned enterprises are different (Dong Sik Chang, 2008), the
interaction effect can be changed with the given ownership type.
In China, state-owned enterprises are owned either directly or indirectly
by the government in their ownership structure. While state-owned firms
perform both public interest and profit-seeking behavior, private-owned
firms aim to maximize enterprise value. Therefore, they are distinguished
from private-owned firms (Song, Wang & Cavusgil, 2014; Dong Sik Chang,
2008). In addition, even if the government owns listed enterprises, it is
unlikely that the listed enterprises have the necessary expertise because
they have a wide range of industries. Therefore, it is highly probable that
the outside directors’ service and resource functions will play an important
role in the management of state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the
role of outside directors may be limited in private-owned enterprises since
executives’ expertise in the industry is high and the nature of the
organization is to maximize profits. Thus, the following hypothesis can be
derived on the basis of this logic.
Hypothesis 6: The effect of the positive (+) relationship between
the ratio of outside directors and the financial performance in the
state-owned firm group will be stronger than that of the
relationship in the private-owned firm group.
The ratio of 'directors with political connections' is another proxy
variable that is assumed to be a characteristic of the BOD in this study. In
China, there are a large number of BOD members with a dual position
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indicating their belonging to both the enterprise and the government They
act as a channel to monitor the arbitrary power within the organization on
behalf of the government and propagate the government's guidance within
their enterprises while using the network to supply external resources
within their enterprises (Liu et al., 2016). Therefore, the political
connections of BOD　members are likely to have a positive effect on their
enterprises' financial performance.
However, this effect is also likely to vary depending on the firm
ownership type (state-owned enterprise or private-owned enterprise).
Private-owned enterprises in China are still less stable than state-owned
enterprises due to their late emergence and relatively poor institutional
completeness (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). In addition, compared to state-owned
enterprises, they have difficulties in lending money for investment, and
there is a disadvantage of paying high interest rates (Dong Sik Chang,
2008). Therefore, BOD members with political connections are likely to
contribute to the improvement of financial performance by improving their
financial circulation and financial transaction conditions through their social
capital. In a state-owned enterprise, the organization itself has a direct or
indirect relationship with the government, as well as the possibility of
being transferred to other government agencies. Therefore, there is a
possibility that the degree of involvement in the role of the organization
falls relatively. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived on the basis
of this logic.
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Hypothesis 7: The effect of the positive (+) relationship between
the ratio of directors with political connections and the financial
performance in the private-owned firm group will be stronger
than that of the relationship in the state-owned firm group.
On the one hand, as noted above, many research results show that the
CEO, a principal management agent in corporate governance, has less
financial performance as the tenure becomes longer (McClelland, Barket &
Oh, 2012; Kroll et al., 2000; Miller, 1990, 1993). This is because the
motivation for new attempts and growth (Audia et al., 2000; Hambrick and
Fukutomi, 1991) and the commitment to learning (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1996) fall as the CEO’s tenure lengthens. In this context, what
difference does public-owned and private-owned enterprises have in
relation to the CEO's tenure and its financial performance? First, the CEOs
of the state-owned enterprises are likely to be appointed by the
government because they are directly or indirectly owned by the
government. In addition, the corporate budgeting and the compensation for
management performance are not handled at the CEO’s discretion, but they
are led by the government. Therefore, the CEOs of state-owned enterprises
are less motivated to improve performance than the CEOs of
private-owned enterprises (Jenson and Meckling, 1976). Conversely, the
CEOs of the private-owned firm group are more likely to continue their
activities in order to enhance financial performance even if their tenure is
long since feedback on management performance is clear and their
management failure can lead to their dismissal. Thus, the following
hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this logic.
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Hypothesis 8: The effect of the negative (-) relationship between
the CEO’s tenure and the financial performance in the
private-owned firm group will be weaker than that of the
relationship in the state-owned firm group.
A　CEO may have "political connection" like BOD members. However,
when the CEO, core decision maker and the executives’ representative
(Andrews, 1971; Barnard, 1938; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Mintzberg, 1973;
Selznick, 1957; Thompson, 1967) who takes overall responsibility for
management activities, have political connection, there may be the following
problems: his/her commitment to management activities can be reduced due
to his/her decision-making considering the government and corporate
stakeholders (See, 2009), and his/her power concentration can lead to their
overconfidence or hubris which may eventually deteriorate the financial
performance.
Nonetheless, we have come to the conclusion that the effect of this
relationship will vary depending on the public-owned․private-owned
enterprise status. In private-owned enterprise organizations, there is a
possibility that CEOs with political connections may play a role in
weakening the negative (-) relationship between each independent variable
and the dependent variable by enhancing the legitimacy of enterprises
(Peng, 1997; Xin & Pearce, 1996) because institutional fulfillment is lacking.
In fact, Peng & Luo (2000) found a positive (+) relationship between the
executives’s political connections and the corporate financial performance in
a private-owned firm in China. This is consistent with our hypothesis
logic. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this
logic.
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Hypothesis 9: The effect of the negative (-) relationship between
the CEO's political connection and the financial performance in
the private-owned firm group will be weaker than that of the
relationship in the state-owned firm group.
Ⅳ. Research Methods
4.1 Data Collection
In this study, in order to verify the hypothesis, we have used the
secondary data of state-owned and private-owned enterprises listed
on the SSE as of 2007. Nine-year panel data collected from 2007 to
2014 and from 2008 to 2015 have been used for the independent
variables and the dependent variable respectively in the analysis
process. Among a total of 532 samples, enterprises listed after 2007
have been excluded from the study to make a longitudinal data
analysis over time. Only listed manufacturing enterprises have been
used because corporate financial performance could depend upon the
industries used for analysis. At that time, the manufacturing sectors
have been classified into 14 business codes because each
manufacturing sector may have a different effect on the dependent
variable. In addition, there are enterprises with additional financial
problems (ST enterprise and *ST enterprise)2) which may also have
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an effect on the causal relationship between each independent and the
dependent variable. The corresponding samples have also been
excluded from the study. We could finally sample 405 enterprises
satisfying all of the conditions. 216 state-owned enterprises account
for 53.3% of the total samples, and 189 private-owned enterprises
account for 46.7% of the total samples.
The variables used in this study are based on the input data
sequentially searched from the annual business reports (from 2007 to
2015) of the state-owned and private-owned firms sequentially
reported on the SSE. Independent variables have been collected on
the basis of the ownership structure and executive information in the
equity change and shareholder status of the business report. The
dependent variable has been produced on the basis of the financial
statements in the financial and accounting reports.
4.2 Operational Definition of Variables
4.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in this study is the 'Return On Assets
(ROA)' that shows the financial performance of an enterprise. As the
assertion made by Peng & Luo (2000), 'ROA' is the most appropriate
variable to measure the financial performance of enterprises in China.
2) When a listed enterprise has financial problems for two consecutive years (ST
enterprise) or three years (*ST enterprise), the stock exchange treats the stocks
for the enterprise in question.
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Marquis & Qian (2014) used the ROA as a proxy variable for financial
performance in explaining the political factors affecting the activities of
enterprises in China through a 'Political Response Model'.
The annual business reports (from 2008 to 2015) of the target enterprise
reported on the SSE have been sequentially searched, and the ROA for the
relevant year has been calculated by dividing the enterprise’s net profit by
the total assets and then multiplying by 100.
4.2.2 Independent Variables and Moderating Variables
In this study, we have focused on examining the relationship between
each corporate governance factor and the financial performance of
state-owned․private-owned enterprises in China. In particular, among
corporate governance factors, variables related to principal management
agents, which have been considered to be a somewhat lacking research
area in the study of enterprises in China, are used as a key point in
modeling in the study. Although there have been a number of previous
studies that have identified a significant relationship between principal
management agents and financial performance, they have yet to reach a
consensus and the measurement of the characteristics of these principal
‘management' agents is also limited.
In this study, a principal management agent type used as an independent
variable is classified into a BOD and a CEO. 'Political Connection', which
is another factor showing the characteristics of these independent variables,
is used as a new proxy variable. We have postulated the 'ratio of outside
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directors in the BOD' and the 'ratio of directors with political connections
among the BOD members’ as the characteristics of the BOD. To consider
the characteristics of CEO, the 'CEO’s tenure' and the ‘CEO's political
connections’ are used as independent variables. As the assertion made by
Chizema et al. (2014), BOD members and CEOs meeting the following
conditions are considered to have political connections: 1. a government
official (mayor or vice-governor) or 2. a member of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) or 3. a member of the National
People's Congress (NPC). Accordingly, the annual business reports (from
2007 to 2015) of the relevant enterprise reported on the SSE have been
searched sequentially and the status of officers have been confirmed.
Thereafter, we have calculated the 'political connections of the BOD' by
dividing the number of directors meeting the above criteria by the total
number of directors in the year and then the figure is to be expressed as
a percentage. We have measured the 'political connections of the CEO';
that is, ‘1’ if the CEO meets above conditions; otherwise, ' 0 '.
In this study, in addition to the above four corporate governance-related
variables among corporate governance factors, we have postulated the
‘ownership type’ as the fifth independent and moderating variable to
determine whether the target enterprise is a state-owned enterprise or a
private-owned enterprise. Ownership type has been studied by various
criteria such as state-owned․private-owned enterprise status and
classification by shareholder and ratio difference. However, we have used
the ownership type as a criterion to classify enterprises into state-owned
enterprises and private-owned enterprises, considering the purpose of this
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study and hypothesis logic. It is because various corporate governance
variable factors appearing in both a state-owned enterprise and a
private-owned enterprise are expected to have different causal relationships
with corporate financial performance. Therefore, we have measured the
ownership type variable by classifying and coding the private-owned
enterprise as '1' and the state-owned enterprise as '0'.
4.2.3 Control Variables
In this study, we have used the following control variables: firm age,
firm size, sales, debt-equity ratio and previous year’s financial
performance, the largest shareholder ratio, board size, CEO duality,
industry and year. These figures have also been measured by sequentially
searching the annual business reports (from 2007 to 2015) reported on the
SSE.
First, the firm age should be considered as a control variable because it
can affect the financial performance of the enterprise (Peng, 2004).  Aging
enterprises can have a negative (-) impact on corporate performance
because they are slow to respond to environmental changes due to inertia
formed within their organizations and can be passive about strategic
change. On the other hand, as the assertion made by Peng (2004),
enterprises with higher firm age in China have close ties with the
government and their legitimacy is also likely to be recognized. As a
result, such enterprises are more likely to have a positive effect on
corporate performance. In this study, it shows the possibility that the firm
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age affects the financial performance of the enterprise. Thus, we have used
the firm age measured from the establishment of an enterprise to the
publication of the report as a control variable. As the firm size grows with
similar logic, it is more likely to engage with more stakeholders and the
influence can be expanded (Waddock & Grave, 1997). This can ultimately
have a direct impact on business activities, and it can exert direct or
indirect influence on the financial performance (Kimberly, 1976). As a
result, firm size measured by logarithm of total assets has been used as a
control variable. The gross sales set in the study is also another proxy
variable indicating the firm size and the total financial performance of the
enterprise. Therefore, the enterprise’s gross sales for the previous year are
controlled.
Since the dependent variable used in the study is financial performance,
financial factors and figures should also be controlled. In the case of a
high debt-to-equity ratio, the enterprise can be restricted from various
activities (Chaganti & Damanpuur, 1991). In addition, the financial
performance for the year is highly likely to be affected by the financial
performance for the previous year. The process of reinvestment through
asset accumulation is ultimately the enterprise’s activity. Therefore, the
return on assets (ROA) for the previous year have been measured and
assumed as a control variable. On the other hand, the largest shareholder
is a corporate governance factor and his/her influence can also be
considered as a control variable. This is because the largest shareholder
ratio in China is a key indicator of corporate governance and can have a
significant impact on the enterprise's activities and performance (Li &
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Zhang, 2010). Therefore, we have used the largest shareholder ratio by
calculating the ratio of the shares owned by the largest shareholder among
the total shares issued in the enterprise, and use it as a control variable.
In addition, we have postulated ‘board size’ as a proxy variable measuring
the influence of the BOD, a main management body in corporate
governance, and add the total number of directors as a control variable.
For reference, the samples have been collected around manufacturing
enterprises. Since each sub-sector may have a different effect on the
dependent variable, we have divided them into 14 areas which have been
postulated as control variables: textile · clothing · fur (C1), petroleum ·
chemical · plastics (C4), electronics (C5), metals · nonmetals (C6),
pharmaceutical · bio products (C8). The year is also used as a control
variable by treating it as a dummy variable.
4.3 Analysis Methods
In order to test the hypotheses, we have first postulated the following
independent variables to examine their significance: ratio of outside
directors in the BOD, the BOD’s political connections, the CEO’s tenure, the
CEO’s political connections, and the ownership type. Second, we have used
the ownership type as a moderating variable to verify the interaction effect.
In analyzing panel data, it is necessary to first verify the validity of the
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem. First of all, there is a
possibility that the target enterprises in this study cause heteroscedasticity
due to factors such as business philosophy, group culture, and social
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identity. At this time, a fixed effect model is suitable for effectively
controlling such a characteristic. If the heteroscedasticity is not statistically
related to the covariance in the population, a random effect model is
suitable. As a result of the Hausman test, the estimator of the random
effect model is not a coincident estimator at the significance level of p
<.01. Therefore, we can conclude that it is appropriate to select a fixed
effect model.
On the other hand, the autocorrelation problem, which is another
verification subject, refers to the case where the standard error value is
biased in the fixed effect model. We have verified this by inputting the
"xtserial" command of STATA 13. As a result of the analysis, no problem
of autocorrelation has been found. However, we have proposed a robust
standard error value to control heteroscedasticity in the process (Baltagi,
2008; Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, the mean centering
process has been used as a method to reduce the possibility of
multicollinearity between variables and to increase the ease of regression
coefficients in performing a series of processes.
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Ⅴ. Empirical Analysis Results
5.1 Basic Statistics and Correlation
In this study, we have sampled a total of 405 state-owned and
private-owned enterprises. In particular, they are divided into 189
private-owned firms and 216 state-owned enterprises. The purpose of this
study is to examine the difference between the generalities and the
tendencies of each group. Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
samples used in the study. It is possible to confirm the mean and standard
deviation of the variables obtained from 405 samples over a period of 9
years. It is also possible to identify the variable-specific group differences
on the basis of the average and standardization index of each variable in
the state-owned and private-owned enterprises. As shown in the table, all
variables except firm size have a collective difference at the significance
level of p < .01 or p < .05.
Table A2 shows the Pearson correlation values for the 405 total samples.
The results show that corporate financial performance, the dependent
variable in this study, has a significant correlation with all independent
variables except the political connections of the BOD. In addition,
multicollinearity verification is needed in the correlation analysis process to
see whether there is a high correlation between independent variables. As
a result, there are no problems in multicollinearity because the VIF values
of all variables are lower than 10 (Kennedy, 1998). Therefore, hypothesis
testing has been conducted with these variables.
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5.2 Hypothesis Verification Results
The empirical analysis results of each variable affecting corporate
performance are shown in Table A3.
Model 1 shows the significance between each control variable and the
dependent variable postulated in this study. The firm size and the CEO　
duality do not have a significant relationship with the dependent variables.
However, the gross sales and board size have shown a significant negative
(-) relationship with the dependent variable at the level of p < .01. The
debt-equity ratio and the largest shareholder ratio have also shown a
significant negative (-) relationship with the dependent variables at the
level of p < .05. In addition, the financial performance for the previous
year also shows a significant relationship at p <0.1.
Model 2 shows the result of analyzing the relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variable by adding control variables
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and independent variables in this study. From this, it is possible to confirm
the results of Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 5 derived in the study. As
suggested in Hypothesis 1, it has been found that the positive (+)
relationship between the ratio of outside directors in the BOD and the
financial performance of the enterprise have a significant causal relationship
at the level of p <.01. However, it has been observed that there is no
significant relationship between the ratio of directors with political
connections and the dependent variable. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 has been
adopted, whereas Hypothesis 2 has been rejected. Furthermore, Hypothesis
3 on a negative (-) relationship between the CEO's tenure and the
financial performance of the enterprise and Hypothesis 4 on a negative (-)
relationship between the CEO's political connection and the enterprise's
financial performance have been verified to have significance at p <.01
level. Finally, it is assumed that enterprises are divided into state-owned
enterprises and private-owned firms. Hypothesis 5 on a positive (+)
relationship between the enterprise (coded: private-owned enterprise = 1)
and its financial performance have been verified to have a significant
relationship at p <.05 level. As a result, we can come to the conclusion
that all our logic has been adopted except Hypothesis 2.
On the other hand, Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the significance of the
interaction effect of the ownership type in the relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variable. First, Model 3 shows the
interaction effect of the ownership type (state-owned enterprise or
private-owned enterprise) on a positive (+) effect between the ratio of
outside directors among directors and the financial performance of the
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enterprise. It is possible to confirm that Hypothesis 6 is supported (β =
-0.115, at p <.01 level). There is a still positive relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variables regarding state-owned
firms while (β = 0.078, p <.01), the interaction effect has changed the
regression coefficient sign of the main effect of the private-owned firm. In
Figure A1, the effect of outside directors, which have a positive effect on
the firm's financial performance, is clearly kept in the state-owned firm
group but tends to decline in the private-owned firm group.
On the other hand, Model 5 shows the verification result of the
interaction effect of the ownership type on the negative (-) relationship
between the CEO’s tenure and the financial performance of the enterprise,
which is also significant at the level of p <.01 (Β = 0.120). The main
effect relationship in the state-owned enterprise type still has a significant
negative (-) effect (β = -0.134, at p <.05 level) while the regression
coefficient of the main effect has a positive (-) direction in the
private-owned firm group. Therefore, Hypothesis 8 as well as Hypothesis
6 is supported. The interaction effect between these variables can also be
visualized as shown in Figure A2. In the case of the state-owned firm
group, the direction of the main effect is maintained in the situation where
it is assumed that there a negative (-) effect between each independent
variable and the dependent variable. However, the direction of the main
effect is reversed in the private-owned firm group.
Finally, in Model 6, we have examined the interaction effect of the firm
ownership type on the negative (-) relationship between the CEO's political
connection and the financial performance of the enterprise. As a result, we
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could confirm the interaction effect of the ownership type variable factor on
the relationship between two variables (β = 0.154, at p <.01 level). In the
direct state-owned firm group, it can be seen that there is a negative (-)
relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable
(β = -0.087), at the level of p <.01. In contrast, it can be observed that
the private-owned firm group has the opposite direction. This result shows
that Hypothesis 9 is also adopted. This can be understood more clearly in
Figure A3. That is, the hypothesis about the negative (-) relationship that
the financial performance of the enterprise gets lower as the political
connection of the CEO becomes higher are valid for the state-owned firm
group. On the other hand, it can be seen that the private-owned firm
group takes an opposite direction based on the logic claimed.
----------------------------------
Figure A1 is about here
----------------------------------
----------------------------------
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----------------------------------
----------------------------------
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----------------------------------
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Ⅵ. Discussions and Conclusions
In this study, we have empirically analyzed the relationship between the
characteristics of principal ‘management' agents and financial performance
concerning 'corporate governance' which has not achieved consistent
results through previous research. We have also focused on the interaction
effect of the ownership type in the relationship of the two. This is
consistent with the recent assertion that the studies on the relationship
between each corporate governance factor in China and the financial
performance should practically reflect the specific environment and
background in China (See, 2009).
The findings of the study have the following implications.
First, it has been proven that the characteristics of principal
‘management' agents which have not shown a unified result in relation to
financial performance have significant meaning in a relationship with all the
variables and the dependent variable except for the ratio of the directors
with political connections.
The study on enterprises listed on the SSE focuses on identifying the
longitudinal flow between variables by collecting and verifying nine-year
panel data with reference to their annual business reports from 2007 to
2015.
As shown in the results of Model 2 in Table A3, it can be known that
the ratio of outside directors in the BOD has a positive (+) relationship
with the financial performance of the enterprise. This result contests the
non-relevance between the two variables raised in the previous studies
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(Rashid et al., 2010; Garg, 2007; Hu et al., 2010) and supports the claim
that there is a positive (+) relationship between the two variables (Liu et
al., 2015). Outside directors play the following roles: control, service and
resource dependence. Outside directors have been granted institutional
legitimacy since the enforcement of the <<Guidance on the Establishment
of a Listed Enterprise Independent Director System>> in 2001, and since
the reform of ‘‘Difference of the Stockholder's Rights,“ corporate
governance has improved. As a result, their influence has expanded. They
could eventually have a positive (+) relationship with the financial
performance.
The relationship between the characteristics of the CEO, another principal
management agent, and the financial performance is also interesting. First,　
as suggested by McClelland et al. (2012), Kroll et al. (2000) and Miller
(1990, 1993),　it can be seen that the negative (-) relationship between the
'tenure' of the CEO　and the financial performance is also applied to listed
enterprises. This result supports the following logic: the longer the CEO’s
tenure becomes, the less the motivation for growth and development and
commitment to learning gets (Audia et al., 2000; Hambrick & Fukutomi,
1991; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996); thus, the longer CEO tenure has a
negative (-) impact on the financial performance. Furthermore, the
following hypothesis has also been proven: the effect of CEOs having a
symbolic presence in the organization has a negative effect on the financial
performance when they have political connections. This result supports the
following hypothesis: their dual position can reduce the intensity of their
involvement only in corporate performance (See, 2009) and weaken the
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corporate governance control system as a result of their power
concentration more than necessary (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). They eventually
have a negative impact on the financial performance. There have been
studies of 'political connections' in other countries except China (Yu &
Lee, 2016; Goldman et al., 2008). However, there is a clear difference
between the political connections defined in those studies and that assumed
in the study of China. There are few papers that have examined the
longitudinal relationship between the BOD and CEO’s political connections
and the financial performance by separating the characteristics of the BOD
from those of the CEO. Therefore, it can be said that we have made a
theoretical contribution to such a study. One interesting point is that there
has been no significant relationship between the 'political connections' of
the BOD and the financial performance. Compare this to the results of
studies proving that such characteristics have a positive (+) relationship
with corporate social responsibility activities (CSR) (Liu et al., 2016; Liu &
Lee, 2016). It is possible to speculate that the political connections of the
BOD can be concentrated not on direct resources to enhance the financial
performance but rather on the role of disseminating government-initiated
systems and promoting corporate reciprocal activities.
The second implication of this study is that the significance of the
independent and moderating variable of the ownership type is verified. As
mentioned in the research background, the state-owned and private-owned
enterprises in China have evolved with different birth backgrounds and
legal bases. For this reason, we have thought that there would be
organizational differences between them. As shown in Model 2 of Table
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A3, there is a significant difference between the financial performance of
state-owned firms and that of private-owned firms in China. The result
supports the claim that the financial performance of the private-owned firm
group pursuing its clear organizational goal (revenue maximization) is
higher than that of the state-owned firm group (Song et al., 2015; Wei et
al., 2005; Yu & Zheng, 2014).
These collective characteristics show a significant difference in relation to
financial performance through the interaction effect with the characteristics
of ownership. Table A3 shows the interaction effect between the ratio of
outside directors and the ownership type in the relationship with the
financial performance as shown graphically in Figure A1. In the analysis,
there is a positive (+) relationship with the main effect. However, the
higher the ratio of outside directors in the private-owned firm group
becomes, the lower the financial performance gets. On the other hand, the
higher the ratio of outside directors in the state-owned firm group
becomes, the higher the financial performance gets. This result shows that
the positive effect of outside directors on the organization is more effective
in state-owned enterprise organizations. This indicates that the service and
resource functions of outside directors can practically be more effective in
state-owned enterprise organizations regarding the operation of enterprises
in China.
Similarly, Model 5 and Figure A2 in Table A3 illustrate the interaction
effect between the CEO's tenure and the ownership type in the relationship
with the financial performance. It is assumed that there is a negative (-)
relationship between the CEO's tenure and the financial performance. As
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the CEO's tenure gets longer, the financial performance of the
private-owned firm group increases but that of the state-owned firm group
decreases. That is, the private-owned firm group has a relatively more
performance-oriented organizational culture than the state-owned firm
group, since the previous performance of the CEO can have a significant
influence on the CEO’s tenure. It can be assumed that the level of
motivation of the CEO is relatively high in order to improve management
performance even though the tenure gets extended. On the other hand, in
the state-owned firm group, the CEO is led by the government and the
non-performance-based incentive schemes constitute the majority (Bai and
Xu, 2005; Dong Sik Chang, 2008). Therefore, the longer the CEO’s tenure
becomes, the less motivating factors to improve financial performance get.
Finally, Model 6 of Table A3 and Figure A3 illustrate the interaction
effect between the CEO's political connection and the ownership type in
the relationship with the financial performance. In detail, in the
private-owned firm group, there is a positive (+) relationship between the
CEO's political connection and the firm's financial performance. On the
other hand, in the state-owned firm group, there is a negative (-)
relationship maintained with the main effects. This is because the CEOs’
political connections in the private-owned firm group can be used as social
capital leading to various activities for enhancing the financial performance
of their enterprises. In addition, it can be found that political connections
play the role of enhancing the legitimacy of private-owned firms which
relatively lack institutional perfection (Peng, 1997; Xin & Pearce, 1996). On
the other hand, if the CEOs in the state-owned firm group have political
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connections, their interests with the government become more intense and
the negative psychological factors (e.g., overconfidence or hubris impacts)
caused by their power concentration lead to their management activities.
In addition, we have not postulated the ownership type as an independent
and moderating variable. However, in order to investigate more specifically
the causal relationship in each group, the significance of the independent
and dependent variables is further verified in the private-owned firm group
and in the state-owned firm group respectively as shown in Table A4.
Models 2 and 3 can be used to determine the significance of directionality
and the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent
variables in each group. The ratio of outside directors (+), the CEO’s
tenure (-) and the CEO’s political connections (-) have been verified where
the whole groups are at the level of p < .01 . In the private-owned firm
group, all the variables have a significant opposite directional relationship.
On the contrary, in the state-owned firm group, all the variables except for
the political connections of the BOD, which have not been verified for
significance, have shown the same directivity as the hypotheses with
respect to the whole groups, and the relationship also turns out to be
significant. The different effects and directivity of each group support the
moderation effect of the ownership type on the relationship between
corporate governance and financial performance shown in Figures A1, A2
and A3.
----------------------------------
Table A4 is about here
----------------------------------
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The implications discussed above may be regarded as the differentiating
characteristics of this study, but they also contain some limitations. First,
there are limitations in the data collection and analysis process. In the
study, the independent variables from 2007 to 2014 and the dependent
variables from 2008 to 2015 have been collected for nine years. However,
only 405 enterprises have finally selected to analyze the balance panel data
due to the process of excluding enterprises on which we could not carry
out a follow-up study for 9 years. In the future, there is a need for a
study on more enterprises. In addition, since only manufacturing enterprises
that have all variable values required for research are targeted, the samples
are limited. Since only listed enterprises are sampled, the question of
whether these characteristics represent all Chinese enterprises may be
raised. In the future, studies on Chinese enterprises need to resolve such
problems.
Second, in this study, various variables have been used as control
variables for more accurate research. However, there are still limitations in
not controlling the additional factors that may affect the dependent
variables in addition to the set control variables. For example, the
demographic and statistical characteristics of CEOs and BODs can affect
corporate performance (Gul & Leung, 2004; Lattemann et al., 2008).
Therefore, more precise research reflecting this point should be conducted
in the future.
Finally, in this study, we have used the following as proxy variables: the
ratio of outside directors in the BOD, the ratio of directors with political
connections, the tenure of the CEO and the state-owned․private-owned
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enterprise status. However, there are limitations even though there may be
various proxy variables (e.g., characteristics of the BOD and CEO, the
ownership type, etc.) to show the concept, they have not been used more
widely.
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[Table A1] Descriptive Statistics
a.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables Mean Std. Dev. private-owned enterprise state-owned enterprise
Rank-sum Z for the 
difference
1. ROA 0.223 0.741 0.266  0.194 8.208***
2. firm age 15.092 4.823 13.842 17.217 4.219***
3. firm size 23.702 2.442 23.920 25.592 1.204 
4. sales 18.795 2.312 19.795 17.795 17.432***
5. debt ratio 0.554 0.665 0.535 0.603 0.893***
6. performance 0.201 1.012 0.269 0.168 5.135***
7. largest shareholder 0.448 0.181 0.361 0.443 5.020***
8. board size 9.813 2.455 10.432 9.790 -13.773***
9. CEO duality 0.118 0.391 0.117 0.194 5.172***
10. outside director 0.370 0.059 0.369 0.371 -2.437***
11. politically connected  board 0.164 0.150 0.180 0.147 2.075**
12. CEO tenure 4.439 3.157 4.461 5.728 6.054***
13. politically connected CEO 0.081 0.213 0.075 0.105 1.307**
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[Table A2] Correlation Matrix
　 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
ROA 1
firm age 0.026 1
firm size 0.024 0.067*** 1
sales 0.257*** 0.039** 0.030* 1
debt ratio 0.013* 0.023* 0.009* -0.028* 1
performance 0.025 -0.020 0.080*** 0.118*** 0.003 1
largest 
shareholder -0.051*** 0.153*** 0.071*** 0.049*** 0.057*** -0.045*** 1
board size -0.061*** -0.091*** -0.004 0.228*** -0.026 0.044** -0.011 1
CEO duality 0.023 0.011 0.051*** -0.072*** 0.015 0.030** -0.055*** -0.067*** 1
ownership type 0.113*** -0.083*** -0.023 0.228*** -0.067*** 0.015 -0.080*** -0.124*** -0.086*** 1




0.007 -0.063*** 0.108*** 0.042** -0.014 0.034* -0.098*** -0.058*** 0.095*** -0.002 0.051*** 1
CEO tenure -0.034** 0.115*** -0.004 0.079*** -0.010 -0.064** -0.069*** 0.012 0.023 -0.143*** 0.061*** 0.023 1
politically 
connected CEO -0.043** 0.022 -0.049 -0.053*** -0.084 -0.045** 0.033 -0.079*** 0.015 -0.012 0.075*** 0.102*** 0.101***
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[Table A3] The fixed-effects panel estimates for governance factors towards financial performance
a. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b. years, industry, dummies are included but not reported 
　 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

































































































































































































Observations 3645 3645 3645 3645 3645 3645
Number of 
firms 405 405 405 405 405 405
R-squared 0.117 0.139 0.187 0.139 0.174 0.198 
F statistic 24.970 18.060 19.840 17.390 18.750 18.820 
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[Table A4] The fixed-effects panel estimates for governance factors toward financial
performance each group
a. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b. years, industry, dummies are included but not reported 




















































































Observations 3645 1701 1944
Number of firms 405 189 216
R-squared 0.129 0.116 0.142
F statistic 17.390 15.130 12.250
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[Figure A1] The moderating effect of ownership type on the link between
outside BOD ratio and financial performance
[Figure A2] The moderating effect of ownership type on the link between
CEO tenure and financial performance
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[Figure A3] The moderating effect of ownership type on the link between
political connection of CEO and financial performance
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Study 2: The Impact of Corporate
Governance on Strategic Change




Although the Chinese government is making efforts to improve
corporate governance by attempting to separate ownership and
management through the reform of Difference of the Stockholder's
Rights at the end of 2006, There are still many state-owned
enterprises among listed enterprises. Since state-owned enterprises have
differentiated governance and organizational characteristics, there is a
need for a more systematic approach to the study of management
strategies. In this study, based on the legal and theoretical grounds, we
have divided state-owned enterprises into State-Owned Shares and
State-Owned Legal Person Shares in terms of ownership type, and we
have also focused on identifying the effects of these on the relationship
between corporate governance and strategic change. In particular, there
has been a great deal of research on the relationship of the
characteristics related to principal ‘management' agents among the
corporate governance factors and strategic change. Therefore, we have
included not only the characteristics of principal ‘management' agents
but also the characteristics of 'ownership' holders in corporate
governance factors to examine the causal relationship with the
dependent variable. Among the state-owned enterprises listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), we have finalized 270 enterprises
observable for nine years from 2007 to 2015, and we have analyzed
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them as a fixed effect model. First, we have considered the ratio of
outside directors in the BOD and the CEO’s tenure as the
characteristics of principal ‘management' agents, and we have
considered the ownership concentration and the ownership type as the
characteristics of 'ownership' holders. We have postulated such
characteristics as independent variables and have revealed the causal
relationship of them with strategic change.
In addition, we have redefined the ownership type of a state-owned
enterprise as a moderating variable and have examined its interaction
effect on the causal relationship between each independent and
dependent variable. According to the results of the empirical analysis,
all four independent variables proposed in the study have a significant
relationship with dependent variables, and all the hypotheses also
support the interaction effect depending on the ownership type of each
state-owned enterprise. Recently, there have been rapidly increasing
studies on management strategy targeting Chinese enterprises. For this
reason, this study is aimed not only at raising awareness of the need
for a theoretical approach to Chinese enterprises considering
environment uniqueness but also at verifying the effect of corporate
governance factors as leading variables affecting strategic change in
Chinese enterprises in various aspects.
Keywords: Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in China, Ratio of
Outside Directors in the BOD, CEO’s Tenure, Concentration, Ownership,
Ownership type, Strategic Change
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Ⅰ. Introduction
As globalization and the development of IT technology accelerate
changes in the industrial environment, corporate strategy is attracting
attention as a major factor for corporate survival and prosperity. This
is because the choice of a flexible and appropriate strategy, which
takes into account the internal and external conditions of the
organization, can change the success or failure of the organization
(Andrew, 1997; Kisfalvi, 2000). The strategic choice theory is used as
the basis for the view that the open position on the environment
should be taken and competitive advantage should be secured through
active and situational coping of the organization. This is different from
the previous positions that have viewed the environmental factors
surrounding the organization as structural and static.
In this respect, research on corporate strategy has been actively
pursued in line with such trends, such as the viewpoint of strategic
change (e.g., Tushman & Romannelli, 1985; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1985;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), the definition of strategic change (e.g.,
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; Haynes &
Hillman, 2010), the leading factors of corporate strategic change (e.g.,
Golden & Zajac, 2001; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007, Datta, Rajagopalan
& Yan, 2003) and the causal relationship between corporate strategic
change and corporate performance (e.g., Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010;
Boeker, 1997). In the practical area, there is high interest in corporate
strategy. This is not only because the importance of short-term and
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emergent strategic change meeting a rapidly changing environment is
growing, but also because securing competitive advantage beyond the
meaning of countermeasures can guarantee the sustainable growth of
the enterprise.
Defining what an enterprise's strategy is should be preceded.
However, it is noteworthy that there is a difference in assumptions
about what motivates the enterprise to choose strategic change. In
corporate turnaround theory, the enterprise feels the necessity of
strategic change if its performance is poor or if it does not make
enough profit. On the other hand, in expansion theory, sufficient funds
and high performance in the enterprise lead to its strategic change.
This implies that the research subjects and the scope also differed from
each other by presupposing conflicting assumptions. For example, the
representative research subjects based on corporate turnaround theory
are corporate governance factors such as the tenure and dismissal of
principal ‘management' agents and other characteristic dynamics.
Studies on the relationship between these and strategic change assume
that strategic change is caused by low performance (e.g., Boeker, 1997;
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). On the contrary,
studies based on expansion theory presuppose the abundant financial
resources of the enterprise to examine strategic change such as
diversification, new business and technology investment (Kelly &
Amburgey, 1991; Haveman, 1992; Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014; Klarner
& Raisch, 2013). However, these prerequisites have the limitation that
they cannot account for the strategic change selected by the enterprise
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or the internal factors of the enterprise in a situation where financial
change is not significant but consider only the strategic change selected
in the specific financial situation of the enterprise. In fact, it is not
difficult to find an enterprise that does not replace its executives even
in its worst financial performance situation or does not show any
strategic change such as investing in abundant financial condition.
Therefore, in this study, we have focused on these points and find
motivation of corporate strategic change from other internal
characteristics of organization. According to the assertion made by
Child (1972), factors such as environment, size, and technology can be
the constraints of strategic choice but cannot determine corporate
governance. The absolute factors determining the organizational
structure are the interests and power of the dominant coalitions. This
means that corporate governance is determined by the dominant
coalition, organizational ownership and management, leading to strategic
choice. This makes it possible to draw the inference that the
relationship between principal agents (CEO and BOD) of corporate
strategic change and the ownership holder (block holder) having a
'consignment-agency' relationship with principal ‘management' agents
will determine the organizational structure and lead to strategic change
fitting the situation of the enterprise. There have been attempts to
identify the relationship between governance factors and strategic
change (e.g., Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Barker & Duhaime, 1997),
but the research subjects tend to focus on the CEO (e.g., Kim & Kim,
2015; Henderson, Miller & Hambrick, 2006; Chen, 2013). This is
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because the CEO plays a leading role as a decision maker in the
enterprise (Barker & Duhaime, 1997), and his/her cognitive base and
characteristics can have a significant impact on strategic change
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However, there is still a lack of research
on the BOD, another major subject of strategy selection. The
'ownership' holder can be regarded as another axis of corporate
governance, but there are not enough studies on the relationship
between the characteristics of the 'ownership' holder and strategic
change.
Despite the rapid growth of listed enterprises in China, there have
been no studies examining the relationship between corporate
governance factors and strategic change (This is the result of
searching keywords such as 'strategic change' through major academic
databases). Therefore, it is necessary to make an attempt to fill this
academic gap. At that time, the most important thing to study in
Chinese enterprises is to understand the special corporate governance
form that is derived from the socialist economic system. This is
because of the following. Since its reform and opening in 1978, the
establishment of private-owned enterprises has been allowed. It
succeeded in separating ownership and management by reforming the
"Difference of the Stockholder's Rights" at the end of 2006 (Dong Sik
Chang, 2008). However, the majority of listed enterprises are still
state-owned enterprises. These state-owned enterprises are classified
into state-owned shares and state-owned legal person shares in terms
of the ownership type. The corporate governance of Chinese enterprises
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is also differentiated from the general structure in the capitalist market
economy system. Despite these facts, studies on listed enterprises in
China have mainly focused on identifying the ownership type of either
state-owned firm or a private-owned firm (e.g., Delios, Zhou & Xu,
2008; Hu, Tam & Tan, 2010; Song, Wang & Cavusgil, 2014; Li et al.,
2015). There is a limit to the ownership type of a state-owned
enterprise since it uses relatively simple classification criteria such as
area (Xia & Walker, 2015), central․local state-owned enterprise status
(Li et al., 2015) without considering the purpose or the management
style of each enterprise. Therefore, in this study, state-owned
enterprises are classified into state-owned shares and state-owned legal
person shares, reflecting the characteristics of historical and institutional
differentiation processes and governance structures to identify the
causal relationship between the corporate governance characteristics of
two these groups and the outcome variables.
This process will be able to provide the following two theoretical
contributions at the same time as filling the academic gap presented
above. First, we have extended the scope of research that has been
concentrated on principal ‘management' agents to 'ownership' holders
in the relationship between corporate governance and strategic change
to understand the causal relationships between the overall factors of
corporate governance and corporate strategic change. As mentioned,
there are a number of studies on the dismissal, tenure, and personal
characteristics of the CEO among principal ‘management' agents. On
the other hand, there is a lack of research on the relationship between
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the characteristics of the BOD and strategic change even though the
BOD can play an important role in the CEO’s decision making.
Moreover, ownership holders are regarded as a major axis of corporate
governance research, and there are many different studies on the
relationship between their characteristics and management performance
(e.g., Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Garg, 2007; Bruno & Classens, 2010;
Rashid et al., 2010; Li & Zhang, 2010; Liu et al., 2015) so that they
have reached the maturity stage. On the other hand, research on the
effect of their characteristics on strategic decision making in the
enterprise is in its early stage, and it is even more insufficient if the
research target is restricted to listed enterprises in China. Therefore,
we have examined the relationship between the various characteristics
of corporate governance factors and strategic change in view of this
trend.
Second, the collective characteristics of state-owned shares and
state-owned legal person shares have not been specifically classified in
the previous studies on Chinese state-owned firms which can be
considered as the core and root of China's independent socialist
economic system. We have classified these collective characteristics to
verify the differences in the effects between corporate governance
variables and strategic change in these two groups. Although there
have been many studies on state-owned firm groups (e.g., Xu &
Wang, 1999; Qi et al., 2000; Gunasekarage et al., 2007), there has been
no systematic study of the historical, institutional and structural
differences between the two groups. Therefore, as we have identified
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the differences between the two groups, it is expected that this study
can contribute to expanding the academic field of Chinese state-owned
enterprises in the future and to enhancing the understanding of various
interests related to these two groups in the field of practice.
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Ⅱ. Theoretical Background
2.1 Level of strategic change and Corporate
Governance
2.1.1 Definitions: Strategic Change and Level of Strategic Change
The dramatic changes in the environment surrounding enterprises
brought about by globalization have increased the importance of
corporate strategy selection according to the situation. This is because
the enterprise needs to respond flexibly to the environment for its
survival and contiuous prosperity (Andrews, 1997; Kisfalvi, 2000). This
trend has left enterprises with the task of creating a short-term,
unintended, or emergent strategy for the situation and thereby ensuring
a competitive advantage in the marketplace (Yun-Dal Sung, Jong-Hun
Park, 2014).
In order to establish a clear corporate strategy, it is necessary to
precede the definition of 'strategic change' which is used in various
meanings. This is because the definition of strategic change can be
further refined to provide realistic implications for strategic change
(Snow & Hambrick, 1980). In general, there is a broad sense of
strategic change as a change in the overall characteristics of the
organization, such as organizational structure and culture (Tushman &
Romannelli, 1985). There is also a narrow sense of strategic change
that is recognized as a change in corporate strategy or competitive
strategy.
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In the case of the former, it recognizes changes in organizational
characteristics, including internal and external factors such as
organizational culture, organizational culture and environment as
strategic change (Ansoff, 1965). On the other hand, the latter accepts
only changes in the business portfolio of the enterprise or actions taken
to create competitive advantage in ongoing projects as strategic change
(Porter, 1985; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In the field of management
strategy, strategic change in the meaning of consultation is generally
used, which also shows different applications of corporate strategy or
competitive strategy depending on the research subject and method
(Yun-Dal Sung․Jong-Hun Park, 2014). For example, in the case of
business diversification research, the target enterprises are not limited
to specific industries, so the level of strategic change should be
understood as a change in corporate strategy. On the other hand, when
researching enterprises in a specific industry, it is reasonable to define
strategic change as a competitive strategy perspective as a part of
short-term resource allocation and response to secure competitive
advantage.
In this study, we have defined strategic change as a change in
competitive strategy and define the change of resource allocation
method in order to compete in the current business area (Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1990). In addition, we have defined the level or degree
of strategic change over a period of time as the level of strategic
change (Haynes & Hillman, 2010) and examine the causal relationship
with the affecting governance factors.
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2.1.2 Leading Factors of Strategic Change: Corporate Governance
On the other hand, the leading factors influencing the level of
strategic change have been discussed in various ways. There are the
following representative studies: the relationship between organizational
situations and strategic change related to previous performance (e.g.,
Boeker, 1997), the relationship between structural inertia and the level
of strategic change according to firm size and firm age (e.g.,
Haveman, 1993) and the causal relationship of industry dynamics and
firm flexibility with the level of strategic change (e.g., Dess & Beard,
1984; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007). It is
presupposed that the characteristics of the organization itself or the
environmental factors appearing within the industry affect the level of
strategic change of the firm.
On the other hand, there have been steadily continued studies on the
causal relationship between the characteristics of ownership and
management, which are characteristics of corporate governance factors,
and the level of strategic change. There are many studies focusing on
the CEO and the BOD, which are regarded as principal strategic
change agents, and on the relationship between them (e.g., Datta,
Rajagopalan & Yan, 2003; Haynes & Hillman, 2010). In particular, there
are a number of studies involving the CEO (e.g., Kim & Kim, 2015;
Henderson, Miller & Hambrick, 2006; Chen, 2013). In detail, there are
studies on the relationship between the period of executives’ industrial
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experience and the level of strategic change (e.g., Finkelstein et al.,
2009), the relationship between the CEO's tenure and the level of
strategic change (e.g., Boeker, 1997; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
However, the effects of corporate governance on the level of strategic
change still do not lead to consistent consensus on the results of the
study. In addition, research has concentrated on principal ‘management'
agents among governance factors. This academic gap is similarly
shown in studies on listed Chinese enterprises. In 2006, the reform of
the "Difference of the Stockholder's Rights" led to the separation of
ownership and management of listed enterprises. However, due to the
lack of understanding of the Chinese economic system and the specific
environment, there is a lack of research on the causal relationship of
ownership and management characteristics with corporate strategic
change. Therefore, we have intended to conduct a study to improve
these points.
2.2 Ownership Type Classification of State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) in China
2.2.1 State-Owned Firms and State-Owned Legal Person Firms
So far, the majority of studies on Chinese listed enterprises have focused
on only state-owned firms regarding the relationship between management
performance and strategy (e.g., Hu, Tam & Tan, 2010; Xiong, Li &
Wang, 2008; Liu et at., 2016). This is because a number of enterprises
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listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (SZSE) are in the form of state-owned enterprises. However,
the listed Chinese enterprises are divided into state-owned firms,
state-owned legal person firms and private-owned legal person firms
(Zhou, 2012). Since the historical background and organizational
characteristics of each corporate group are different, there is a need for a
study on the ownership type in detail. In general, a state-owned enterprise
is used as a concept that includes a state-owned firm and a state-owned
legal person firm. A private-owned legal person firm can be accepted as a
private owned enterprise. Here, from the viewpoint of the existing market
economy system, the subject that does not have clear conceptualization is
related to state-owned legal person firms. A state-owned legal person firm
belongs to the state-owned firm group because its ownership holder is the
state when the ownership type is classified into a state-owned enterprise
and a private-owned enterprise. However, a state-owned legal person firm
belongs to the legal person firm group when the ownership type is
classified into a state-owned firm and a legal person firm. Therefore, it is
necessary to pay attention to studying the ownership types of listed
enterprises in China.
The dictionary definition of a state-owned firm and a state-owned legal
person firm is as follows. First, a state-owned firm means an entity that
can make investments on behalf of the state or an enterprise formed by a
government agency investing in a corporation. On the other hand, a
state-owned enterprise or business unit, which has a corporate
qualification, is regarded as a state-owned legal person firm formed by
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investing in a corporation with its own corporate assets (Shu, 2012). All
state-owned enterprises (SOE) in China were originally in the form of a
state-owned firm. However, the plan for the reform of state-owned
enterprises was discussed at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 14th Central
Committee of the CPC. Since 1992, the differentiation of state-owned firms
into state-owned legal person firms has begun. The transition to a
state-owned legal person firm was limited to the following cases: the
distinction of rights and responsibilities and property rights between the
government and the enterprise should be clearly defined, and the business
area where assets can be increased through scientific management. For
these reasons, the state-owned legal person firm group has a tendency to
focus on maximizing profits. The management of the state-owned firm and
the state-owned legal person firm was unified since the establishment of
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) under the State Council in 2004. The corporate governance of
listed state-owned firms and legal person firms has improved since the
reform of Difference of the Stockholder's Rights in 2006.
Understanding the governance characteristics of state-owned firms and
state-owned legal person firms can be enhanced by identifying the
characteristics of investment and share relationships. Figure 1 shows the
investment and share relationship of Sinopec, which represents a
state-owned firm, and Tsingtao, which represents state-owned legal person
firms. SASAC, the entity that is responsible for the unified management of
state-owned assets, is called the 'actual manager3)'. There are differences
3) It is a formal term to explain the relationship with share-holdings the 
business reports of state-owned firms and state-owned legal person firms. 
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between SASAC (central) directly under the State Council and SASAC
(local) under the Qingdao city have a difference. However, in the broader
sense, they share the common point that their actual owner and investor is
the Chinese government. An important factor differentiating the group
characteristics of state-owned firms from that of state-owned legal person
firms lies in the role of the 'Controlling Shareholder' located at the center
of the investment structure. In the figure 1B, Sinopec Group holds a
70.86% share as the controlling shareholder of Sinopec, a listed enterprise.
It can be seen that Tsingtao Brewery Group, a state-owned legal person
firm, owns a 30.83% share as a controlling shareholder of Tsingtao
Brewery Company Limited, a listed enterprise. The difference between
state-owned firms and state-owned legal person firms reside in the
structure of profit distribution of their listed enterprises, not in the
difference of shareholding ratio.
In the case of a state-owned firm, the state-owned asset management
body (e.g., SASAC under the State Council) which is the ‘actual manager’
of the dividend income of listed enterprises (e.g., Sinopec) controls supply
and demand, incorporates it into the state-owned asset management
budget, and uses it in accordance with national regulations. However, in
the case of a state-owned legal person firm, the dividend income of a
listed firm (Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited) is transferred to and
managed by its state-owned legal person firm which acts as the
‘controlling shareholder (e.g., Tsingtao Brewery Group).’ That is, both
state-owned firms and state-owned legal person firms have a
government-owned outward structure. In the case of a state-owned firm,
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the 'actual manager' reclaims the profits of the firm, and its 'controlling
shareholder' plays an intermediate role. In contrast, in the case of a
state-owned legal person firm, the ‘actual manager' only serves as its
ownership holder and its 'controlling shareholder' has authority over its
management and performances. In the case of state-owned firms with
public interest, such a collective characteristic can increase the effect of
limiting the role of the controlling shareholder and directly controlling
corporate activities which pursue only their performance. On the other
hand, in the case of state-owned legal person firms, the discretionary
power of the controlling shareholder, a state-owned legal person firm, will
increase since the government does not intervene directly. As a result, this
can be an incentive to increase corporate productivity.
----------------------------------
Figure B1 is about here
----------------------------------
As presented above, in addition to the historical background of
state-owned and state-owned legal firms, the characteristics of the
investment and share relationship in corporate governance, legal and
institutional differences in principal management agents are the factors that
determine the differentiated characteristics of the two groups’ corporate
governance. In particular, the powers and responsibilities of the 'actual
manager' and 'controlling shareholders' in the personnel management
system of listed enterprises have distinct differences. First, in the case of a
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state-owned firm, the Organization Department of the CPC and SASAC,
the ‘actual manager’, not only have authority to recommend and appoint the
executives of listed enterprises but also have authority over the executives
of the ‘controlling shareholders’, under the <Chinese Communist Party
Code> and the <Corporate Law>. Therefore, the CEO and BOD of the
'controlling shareholders' appointed by the 'actual manager' have only the
authority to nominate candidates for the executives of listed enterprises and
do not have the right to appoint the final executive. Thus, it can be
inferred that the government-centered management is actually handled by
the ‘actual manage’.
On the other hand, a state-owned legal person firm has a structure in
which the personnel authority is clearly distinguished between the 'actual
manager' and the 'controlling shareholders', compared to the state-owned
firm. In other words, it is not the fact that all the personnel rights and
responsibilities to listed enterprises are concentrated on the 'actual
manager' like a state-owned firm. However, its 'controlling shareholders'
have the right to recommend and appoint personnel for the CEO and the
BOD composition of its listed enterprise, and the ‘actual manager' have the
authority to form the executives of its 'controlling shareholder'. Since the
difference in the personnel systems and authority for the executives are
directly related to the issue related to the independence of listed
enterprises’ management from the 'actual shareholders', it can cause a
significant difference in the establishment and execution of corporate
strategy.
In this study, it is assumed that the there are differences between the
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characteristics of the state-owned firm group and that of the state-owned
legal person firm group for the above reasons. We argue that there is a
need for such ownership classification in the future study of state-owned
firms in China.
Ⅲ. Hypotheses
3.1 Principal 'Management' Agents in Corporate
Governance and Level of Strategic Change
3.1.1 BOD and Level of Strategic Change
Outside directors play an important role in corporate decision making
as a part of the BOD, and compared to inside directors, they can stick
to the role of protecting shareholders' rights from an objective
standpoint since they have relatively little personal interest in the CEO
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). This means that they can enhance the
efficiency of corporate governance and improve corporate performance
by monitoring and controlling the CEO’s opportunistic behavior among
outside directors’ functions discussed in previous research (Walters et
al., 2008). Furthermore, they also play a role in representing the
interests of the shareholders, who are the ownership holders of the
enterprise, (Kim & Yoo, 2015) by evaluating whether the CEO makes
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the right decision to improve the performance (Brudney, 1982; Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1992).
In this way, outside directors act as assistants rather than as
independent decision makers by monitoring and cooperating with the
CEO in decision making to represent the position of the shareholders.
In addition, agency theory and stewardship theory, which presuppose
contradictory assumptions in the past, describe the different functions
and mechanisms of outside directors. However, it is also gaining
momentum from the perspective that it is necessary to view their roles
from a dynamic viewpoint considering the context and composition with
stakeholders, rather than from a static viewpoint (Hendry, 2002; Davis
et al., 1997; Shen, 2003). At the beginning of the CEO’s term, they are
to concentrate on providing services and resources to the CEO who are
not accustomed to organizational culture, operating methods, and
resource acquisition. In the latter half of the CEO’s term, there is a
need for a situational and dynamic approach to focus on monitoring
and controlling the CEO, who has accumulated knowledge about the
enterprise’s operations and has strengthened his/her authority within
the organization (Il Kyoung Kim․Houk Lee, 2013; Henderson et al.,
2006; Kim & Yoo, 2015).
On the other hand, if we look at the functions of the BOD in terms
of corporate strategic change, the expertise and specific background of
outside directors are likely to be important factors in corporate
strategic decision making. In a given competitive environment and
limited financial situation, an enterprise must effectively and efficiently
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allocate the resources in the organization to a wide range of areas and
activities. In this process, if there are outside directors with expertise
in each field, it is possible to increase the justification and credibility of
strategic change. Therefore, as the ratio of outside directors in the
BOD rises, it is more likely that their professional advice and social
capital act as core competencies of the enterprise and positively affect
strategic change within the organization. In particular, in the case of a
state-owned firm, the appointment and dismissal of the CEO is often
determined by the government; therefore, it is not difficult to see that
there is a divergence from the assigned organization’s industrial area
and the CEO’s background. In such a case, the role of outside directors
may play a greater role in making decisions about the strategy
establishment and change in the organization. Therefore, the following
hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this logic.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the ratio of outside directors in the
BOD becomes, the higher the level of strategic change gets.
3.1.2 CEO and Level of Strategic Change
Another principal governance 'management' agent postulate in this
study is 'Chief of Executive Officer (CEO)'. In corporate governance,
there has been great interest in the CEO because he/she not only
becomes the target of surveillance and control but also serves as a
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doer to maximize shareholder value (Jong-Hun Park․Yun-Dal Sung․
Mu-Goan Jeong, 2010). The CEO has been a major concern of business
administration in corporate governance research because he/she plays a
role of key decision maker with overall responsibility for management
activities and performance (Andrews, 1971; Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg,
1973; Selznick, 1957; Thompson, 1967).
In particular, there have been many active studies on the impact of
the CEO’s characteristics on strategic change, such as the relationship
of tenure with the level of strategic change (e.g., Boeker, 1997;
Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Finkelstein et al., 2009), the relationship of
dismissal with the level of strategic change (e.g., Kim & Kim, 2015;
Finkelstein et al., 2009; Weng & Lin, 2012), the relationship between
the type of succession and the level of strategic change (e.g., Karaevli
& Zajac, 2013; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Fredrickson et al., 1988), and the
relationship between the CEO's demographic characteristics and the
level of strategic change (e.g., Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014; Musteen,
Barket & Baeten, 2006; McClelland, Barket & Oh, 2012; Barker &
Mueller, 2002).
A CEO is the chief executive of corporate management activities.
Apart from his/her succession type and personal characteristics, he/she
is involved in a strategic decision-making process that considers the
external environment and organizational reality. This process will lead
to the development of leadership competencies, the accumulation of
professional business processing capabilities and technologies (Harris &
Helfat, 1997; Kotter, 1982), and the establishment of cooperative
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working relationships with internal and external stakeholders (Vancil,
1987). The following points should be noted in this process. In the
early stages of this process, the CEO tends to evaluate and try to
improve existing corporate strategy and try different strategies to find
the best solution (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Henderson Et al., 2006). On
the other hand, in the latter half of the term, his/her power and
discretion increases in the organization and his resistance to the
pressure of strategic change from stakeholders becomes possible.
Therefore, he/she shows a passive attitude toward strategic change
(Shen, 2003; Staw el al., 1981). This implies that his/her
decision-making and attitudes regarding time-specific strategy choices
can be changed depending on his/her duration, regardless of whether
the CEO is dismissed due to an event such as low management
performance. For this reason, we have used 'tenure', which is
considered to reflect the characteristics of the CEO, as a proxy variable
for the causal relationship with the level of strategic change. Thus, the
following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this logic.
Hypothesis 2: The longer the CEO's tenure becomes, the lower
the level of strategic change gets.
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3.2 'Ownership' Holders in Corporate Governance and
Level of Strategic Change
3.2.1 Ownership Concentration and Level of Strategic Change
Ownership concentration refers to the concept of the stock ownership
concentration tendency of the following 'ownership' holders in corporate
governance, such as the largest shareholder, block holders and foreign
or institutional investors. There have been many studies focusing on
how the characteristics of ownership holders (e.g., structure, relation
and concentration) influence business performance variables (e.g., Joh,
2003; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005).
There are two positions on the concentrated ownership structure.
First, like the assertion made by Shleifer & Vishny (1986), there is a
hypothesis that ownership holders will prevent arbitrary management
by raising interest in management performance. On the contrary, like
the assertion made by Burkart et al. (1997), there is also a conflicting
assumption that centralized ownership structure can reduce the
discretion of principal management agents and create a pressurized
environment, so that ultimately generates potential costs. Thus, there is
no consensus on the results of the research on the relationship between
the ownership concentration of various principal agents and various
outcome variables. Here various principal agents include block holders
(e.g., Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990), CEOs (e.g., Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Morck et al., 1988) and institutional investors (e.g., Agrawal &
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Mandelker, 1990). For example, there have been studies on the
relationship between the financial performance regarded as a typical
corporate performance variable and the ownership concentration. Some
study results have shown a positive (+) relationship (e.g., Agrawal &
Mandelker, 1990), but others have shown a negative (-) relationship
(Modigliani & Perotti, 1997; Filatotchev et al., 1999) or no relationship
(Chen et al., 2005; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; McConnell & Servaes, 1990).
The results of this study are as follows. In this way, scholars attempt
to identify the relationship between ownership concentration and
outcome variables (Deng et al., 2013; Hautz et al., 2013; Leung et al.,
2014), and focuses on the effects of situational factors (e.g.,
institutional environment, ownership type, and organizational structure)
rather than the effects of ownership concentration itself.
Given such a situation, we have tried to identify the relationship
between ownership concentration and level of strategic change in this
study. As noted above, the block holders of a Chinese state-owned
firm are divided into 1) government-related shares or 2)
non-government-related shares. The majority of
non-government-related block holders are foreign or institutional
investors who aim to earn money through investment. Therefore, as
the ratio of non-government-related block holders gets higher, it is
more likely that there will be higher pressure to exercise shareholder
rights throughout management and that the need for strategic change
will be emphasized to improve performance. The relationship between
government-related shares and non-government-related shares is
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inversely related. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived on the
basis of the ownership concentration of the government.
Hypothesis 3: The lower the ownership concentration of
government-related shares becomes, the higher the level of
strategic change gets.
3.2.2 Ownership Type and Level of Strategic Change
The ownership type refers to a characteristic produced by grouping
and typing the structural characteristics of an enterprise’s ownership
holders. There have been active studies on the relationship of the
characteristics of corporate governance with the outcome variable and
on the relationship between independent variables and dependent
variables through their interaction (Li et al., 2015). Here, the
characteristics of corporate governance can be produced through
classification based on ownership holders (Andrew, Zhou & Xu, 2008;
Gunasekarage, Hess & Hu, 2007) and classification based on specific
relations (Adams, Taschian & Shore, 1996; Daily & Dollinger, 1992;
Deng et al., 2009).
Given the studies on listed Chinese enterprises, the majority of
studies have focused on state-owned enterprises regarding the
relationship with corporate performance (Hu, Tam & Tan, 2010; Xiong,
Li & Liu et al., 2016; Qi, Wu & Zhang, 2000). However, the enterprises
have been classified into the following categories in terms of the
ownership type: state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private-owned
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enterprises (POE) (Wei et al., 2005; Xu & Wang, 1999; Yu & Zheng,
2014), central SOEs and local SOEs (Li & Zhang, 2009; Li et al., 2015),
and state-owned enterprises and legal person enterprises (Hu et al.,
2010). Therefore, there are growing attempts to identify various
relationships between the ownership type characteristic and
management performance in these days. On the other hand, listed
Chinese enterprises can be divided into state-owned firms, state-owned
legal person firms, and private-owned legal person firms (Zhou, 2012).
The concept of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is usually understood
to include state-owned firms and state-owned legal person firms.
Private-owned legal person firms can be regarded as private-owned
enterprises in the capitalist market economy. State-owned legal person
firms have some characteristics of both SOEs and POEs; thus, it can
cause confusion in the ownership type classification. That is, a
state-owned legal person firm will belong to the state-owned firm
group because its ownership holder is the state when the ownership
type is classified into a state-owned enterprise or a private-owned
enterprise. However, it will belong to the legal person firm group like
other private-owned firms in case of classifying whether its ownership
is state-owned firm or legal person firm. Therefore, it is necessary to
pay attention to studying the ownership types of listed Chinese
enterprises.
In this study, we have postulated the ownership type as another
characteristic of 'ownership' holders to study the state-owned
enterprises in China, and we have identified the relationship of the
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ownership type with the level of strategic change. In other words, it is
assumed that the organizational characteristics with respect to strategic
change will be different depending on whether the ownership type of
an enterprise is a state-owned firm or a state-owned legal person firm.
This hypothesis is based on the differences in organizational
characteristics between state-owned firms and state-owned legal person
firms. First, state-owned firms strongly tend to pursue public interest
rather than profitability as their organizational goal, while state-owned
legal person firms tend to pursue asset growth as their main goal.
Thus, state-owned legal person firms’ attitudes are likely to be more
aggressive in strategy establishment to cope with environmental
changes. Second, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a form of
enterprise that have existed since the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China. Their structural inertia can be higher than that of
the state-owned legal person firms born to be reformed to have
modern corporate governance. Hannan and Freeman (1984) defined
structural inertia as the inertia of organizational structures and
activities that resisted environmental change, and they argued that an
organization with a higher level of organizational inertia had a passive
attitude toward strategic change. Given the situation of Chinese
state-owned enterprises in terms of structural inertia, state-owned
firms are likely to show a more passive attitude toward strategic
change. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of
this logic.
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Hypothesis 4: The state-owned legal person firm group will show
a higher level of strategic change than the state-owned firm
group.
3.3 Interaction effect of the "Ownership" Type
We have concluded that the impact of the characteristics of corporate
governance on level of strategic change in the state-owned legal firm
and state-owned legal person firm groups will be different. Therefore,
we have tried to derive the hypothesis that the ownership type can be
used as a moderating variable.
First, outside directors, principal management agents in corporate
governance, have an independent relationship with the CEO as a group
with expert knowledge (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). It has been
hypothesized that the level of strategic change gets higher as their
ratio gets higher. This is because the outside director's service and
resource functions could increase the justification and credibility of
corporate strategic change to allocate resources effectively in a given
competitive environment and limited financial situation. If so, what
difference is there in the effect of the positive (+) relationship between
the ratio of outside directors and the level of strategic change
depending on the ownership type of each state-owned firm?
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First, many state-owned firms are involved in industries related to
public interest and social infrastructure construction so that the
government is directly involved in the appointment and dismissal of the
CEOs (See, 2009). At that time, new CEOs who have been appointed
to a relevant institution are often transferred from other state-owned
firms or government agencies according to traditional personnel
transfers (Liu et al., 2016). Therefore, there are a number of CEOs
whose backgrounds are not related to the industries to which they
belong. For this reason, the influence of directors with expertise in the
relevant industry is bound to play a significant role in corporate
management, rather than relying on the personal characteristics and
knowledge of the CEOs. In particular, it is expected that outside
directors will be able to simultaneously monitor and control the CEO's
arbitrary management, which has a direct relationship with the
government, in addition to the role of providing services and resources
in the strategic change of a state-owned firm. On the other hand, in a
state-owned legal person firm, its ownership holder is the government,
but it has an independent corporate structure, which ensures
independence from the government in executive composition. In other
words, only the largest shareholder of the enterprise is the government,
and the way of operating the enterprise is no different from that of a
private-owned legal person firm (private-owned enterprise). Therefore,
the influence of the government on corporate management in
private-owned legal person firms can be relatively low, compared to
the state-owned firm. Since the executive composition is also subject
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to the independent decision of the enterprise, it is very likely that the
executives are human resources with expertise and experience in the
relevant industry. In this case, the effectiveness of the services and
resources provided by outside directors to the organization in
private-owned legal person firms may be relatively weak compared to
the state-owned firms. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived
on the basis of this logic.
Hypothesis 5: The effect of the positive (+) relationship between
the ratio of outside directors in the BOD and the level of
strategic change in the state-owned firm group will be stronger
than that of the relationship in the state-owned legal person firm
group.
A CEO is a symbolic principal management agent of an enterprise
and a decision maker with overall responsibility for management
activities and performance (Andrew, 1971; Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg,
1973; Selznick, 1957; Thompson, 1967). For this reason, there have been
various studies on the relationship between the CEO's characteristics
and the level of strategic change (e.g., Boeker, 1997; Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Tenure and dismissal have
been considered as reliable variables for identifying the relational
characteristics between the CEO's characteristics and the level of
strategic change (Su Jung Kim․Chang Su Kim, 2015). In this study,
we have hypothesized that there is a negative (-) relationship between
the CEO's tenure and the level of strategic change. In the early stage
of the CEO’s tenure, he/she makes efforts to evaluate and improve
- 97 -
existing corporate strategy (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Henderson et al.,
2006). However, his power within the organization increases as his/her
tenure becomes longer, and his resistance to the pressure of strategic
change becomes possible. As a result, he/she shows a passive attitude
toward strategic change (Shen, 2003; Staw et al., 1981).
Given this effect to state-owned firms, their structural inertia can be
significant since the establishment period of state-owned firms is
relatively longer than that of the state-owned legal person firms. Since
the main objective of these organizations focuses on public interest
rather than profitability, it is highly likely that their management tends
to be stable and thus to avoid frequent strategic change. Therefore,
their CEOs are also likely to take a passive attitude toward strategic
change. On the other hand, state-owned legal person firms are more
likely to be exposed to an environment in which the relevant industries
are fast-changing and highly competitive, while asset growth and
revenue maximization are the top priorities of the organization.
Therefore, it is inevitable to change their strategy according to the
given situation. The CEOs of state-owned legal person firms are more
likely to try various strategic changes to adapt to market conditions
during their tenure. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived on
the basis of this logic.
Hypothesis 6: The effect of the negative (-) relationship between
the CEO's tenure and the level of strategic change in the
state-owned firm group will be stronger than that of the
relationship in the state-owned legal person firm group.
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This study focuses on the characteristics of the 'ownership' holders
in addition to the variables related to principal ‘management' agents, on
which there have been relatively active studies as leading factors
influencing the level of strategic change. This is because major
shareholders such as the largest shareholder and block holders with the
ownership of an enterprise have a direct or indirect relationship with
the management performance variables (e.g., Joh, 2003; Mak &
Kusnadi, 2005). In addition, the results of this study are as follows. In
this study, we have postulated the ownership concentration as a
characteristic of ownership holders that affect the level of strategic
change, and we have also derived the assumption that there is a
negative (-) relationship between the ownership concentration and the
level of strategic change. This is because previous studies on Chinese
enterprises have not tried to identify the relationship between the
ownership holders and the level of strategic change but have used the
logic based on Chinese state-owned firms’ governance characteristics.
The ownership structure of Chinese state-owned firms can be
broadly divided into government-related shares and
non-government-related shares. It can be known that the largest
shareholder of state-owned firms is a direct or indirect organization of
the government (Dong Sik Chang, 2008). It is worth noting here that
foreign investors and institutional investors account for the majority of
non-government-related shares held by block holders. They tend to
seek a return on investment relative to government-related shares and
to demand strategic change to maximize performance in corporate
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management, which is likely to put pressure on the enterprise
(Dharwadkar et al. 2000; Gedajlovic, 1993; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000)
Therefore, the lower the ownership concentration of
government-related shares gets (meaning that the ownership
concentration of non-government-related shares is higher), the more
likely the enterprise is to be aggressive toward strategic change.
If this logic is applied to state-owned and state-owned legal person
firms, the following can be observed. That is, the organizational
characteristics of state-owned firms tend to pursue both profitability
and public interest. On the other hand, since state-owned legal person
firms aim to increase their assets and to maximize their profits,
non-government-related shares are likely to stimulate their growth
motives more effectively from a fit perspective. In addition, a
state-owned firm's non-government-related shares are highly likely to
be a strategic investment considering relationships rather than
short-term investment trends because it is highly possible that the
investment decision has been made after understanding the
organizational characteristics of the state-owned firm in advance. Thus,
the following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of this discussion.
Hypothesis 7: The effect of the negative (-) relationship between
the ownership concentration of government-related shares and the
level of strategic change in the state-owned firm group will be





In this study, we have used the secondary data of state-owned firms
listed on the SSE for data collection as of 2007. Nine-year panel data
collected from 2007 to 2014 and from 2008 to 2015 have been used
for the independent variables and the dependent variable respectively
in the empirical analysis process. Among the total of 317 samples,
enterprises listed after 2007 have been excluded from the study to
make a longitudinal data analysis over time. Only listed
manufacturing enterprises have been used because corporate strategic
change could depend upon the industries used for analysis. At that
time, the manufacturing sectors have been classified into 14 business
codes because each manufacturing sector may have a different effect
on the dependent variable. In addition, there are enterprises with
additional financial problems (ST and * ST enterprise)4) which may
influence the causality of each research model. The corresponding
samples have also been excluded from the study. We could sample
270 state-owned enterprises satisfying all of the conditions finally
presented. There are 106 state-owned firms in the form of
state-owned shares (39.2% of the total samples) and 164 state-owned
legal person firms (60.8% of the total samples) in the form of
4) When a listed enterprise has financial problems for two consecutive years (ST
enterprise) or three years (*ST enterprise), the stock exchange treats the stocks
for the enterprise in question.
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state-owned legal person share under the state-owned firm
classification presented in this study.
The variables used in this study are based on the input data
sequentially searched from the annual business reports (from 2007 to
2015) of the state-owned firms reported on the SSE. Independent
variables have been collected on the basis of the ownership structure
and executive information in the equity change and shareholder status
of the business report. The dependent variable has been produced on
the basis of the financial statements in the financial and accounting
reports.
3.2 Operational Definition of Variables
3.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in this study is the level of strategic
change. Research on the level of strategic change has been developed
with two major approaches (Weng & Lin, 2012). The first approach
refers to the corporate strategic change as a resource allocation
decision within an enterprise over time to analyze it through financial
indicators. On the other hand, there is also an approach to recognize
a direct change in corporate structure and strategy as an act of
strategic change (Gordon et al., 2000; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).
This study corresponds to the former case based on the measurement
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tool, the Strategic Resource Allocation Profile (SRAP) used by
Carpentor (2000) and Finkelstein & Hambrick (1990). The strategic
resource allocation profile includes the following values: (1)
advertising intensity, (2) research and development intensity, (3) plant
and equipment newness ratio, (4) non-production overhead ratio (5)
inventory levels, (6) financial leverage, and standardized values. The
arithmetic mean, which is defined as being equal to the sum of the
standardized numerical values of each and every observation divided
by the total number of observations, is obtained. The values obtained
through this process mean changes in corporate strategy and
resource input method over time. In addition, the standard deviation
obtained through standardization means the difference from the
industry average value in which the external competitors’ variables
are considered.
3.2.2 Independent Variables and Moderating Variables
This study focuses on 'corporate governance' as a leading factor
affecting the level of corporate strategic change of state-owned firms
in China. First, we have focused on outside directors and CEOs as
principal ‘management' agents. These two principal agents have been
used to identify the relationship between various performance variables
as corporate governance factors, including financial performance and
corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance (Peng, 1997; Rashid et
al., 2010; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Yu (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Karaevli &
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Zajac, 2013; Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014). It has also been known that
these two principal agents have a significant causal relationship with
corporate strategic change (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Karaevli & Zajac,
2013; Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014). Therefore, there can be the
extended logic that the principal agents of state-owned firms in China
can affect corporate strategic change. In order to verify this logic, the
‘ratio of outside directors in the BOD’ and the “tenure of CEO's” have
been used as proxy variables.
Next, we have focused on the "ownership" holders in corporate
governance. First of all, variables should be postulated by considering
the dynamics between major block holders including the largest
shareholder who has core voting rights. This is because of the
following reasons. The largest shareholder of a state-owned firm
directly or indirectly becomes a government. Another block holder,
another government agency, can participate in the management of the
enterprise and exert their influence in addition to the largest
shareholder. For this reason, in order to grasp the real ownership
structure of a Chinese state-owned firm, there is a need for a variable
to consider their relationships. Therefore, we have measured the
ownership concentration by calculating the percentage of the total share
of the block holder owned by the government in the total number of
shares held by the ten largest block holders.
On the other hand, the ownership type can also be an important
characteristic to distinguish the governance characteristics of
state-owned firms. As noted in the introduction, there have been few
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attempts to typifying state-owned firms in earlier studies of
state-owned firms. However, in this study, we have analyzed the
characteristics of the shares owned by the Chinese government and
identified the relationship with the dependent variable according to each
different ownership type. This type of distinction is also used as an
interaction variable in this study. This is because there is a significant
difference in the main effect relationship seen in the reclassified group
according to the ownership type, not in the effect of the state-owned
firms. Therefore, the ownership type variable has been measured by
dividing the state-owned enterprises as follows. That is, a state-owned
enterprise directly owned by the government in the form of
state-owned shares is set to ‘0’, and a state-owned enterprise indirectly
owned by the government through investment in the form of
state-owned legal person shares is set to ‘1’
3.2.3 Control Variables
In this study, we have used the following factors as control
variables: firm age, firm size, sales, previous year’s financial
performance, board size, CEO succession, CEO age, industry and year.
These figures have also been measured by sequentially searching the
annual business reports (2007 to 2015) reported on the SSE.
Let us look at the above factors in order. Firm age should be
postulated as a control variable because it can affect the level of
strategic change. Enterprises with a higher firm age are more likely to
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perceive that their current strategies are stable from the perspective of
corporate survival. Therefore, they are less inclined to change their
inertia as time changes. Therefore, the firm age, which is measured as
the period from the establishment date of an enterprise to the
publication date of its reports, has been used as a control variable,
assuming that it will have a negative (-) relationship with the level of
corporate strategic change (Miller & amp; Chen, 1994). In a similar
vein, we can also assume that an enterprise will have a more passive
attitude toward corporate strategic change as its firm size gets larger.
This is because large enterprises tend to be less interested in changing
their past strategies resulted from their quantitative growth and to be
insensitive to strategy formulation and implementation (Haveman, 1993).
Therefore, the logarithm of the total asset value has been used as a
control variable. Since the gross sales have also been used as a proxy
variable indicating the firm size, the gross sales of the enterprise in the
previous year have been measured and used as a control variable.
On the other hand, it can be inferred that the financial performance
for the previous year will also have a negative (-) relationship with
strategic change. This is because of the following reasons. Enterprises
with poor financial performance are more likely to try strategic change
as a way to improve their performance, while those with better
financial performance are more likely to opt against a particular
strategic change since there is no abnormality in the current strategy
pursued (Boeker, 1997; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). Therefore, we have
assumed that the return on assets (ROA) for the previous year is a
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control variable as a financial performance variable that can affect the
dependent variable (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Huson et al., 2001). The
size of the board can also have a meaningful relationship with changes
in corporate strategy. That is, according to the assertion made by
Golden & Zajac, 2001; Finkelstein et al., 2009, the complexity of the
decision-making process increases as the board size increases.
Therefore, the total number of directors in the BOD can be measured
and assumed as a control variable.
The nature of the CEO can also affect corporate strategic change.
First, when the CEO is appointed from outside, '1' or '0' is assigned
to the CEO. It is possible to measure the succession type of the CEO
and to use it as a control variable by distinguishing between the case
(‘1’) where the CEO is externally appointed and the case ('0') where
the CEO is internally appointed. In general, CEOs from the outside of
the enterprise have a positive attitude toward corporate strategic
change since they show a strong tendency to establish their own
position by establishing new strategic change (Hambrick & Fukutomi,
1991; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). In addition, age, a personal characteristic
of the CEO, can be considered a control variable. This is because older
CEOs tend to show a passive attitude toward changes in their
management style (Datta et al., 2003).
For reference, the samples have been collected around manufacturing
enterprises in this study. Since each sub-sector may have a different
effect on the dependent variable, we have divided them into 14 areas
which have been postulated as control variables: textile · clothing · fur
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(C1), petroleum · chemical · plastics (C4), electronics (C5), metals ·
nonmetals (C6), pharmaceutical · bio products (C8). The year is also
used as a control variable by treating it as a dummy variable.
3.3 Analysis Methods
In this study, we have first postulated the corporate
governance-related factors (ratio of outside directors in the BOD,
CEO's tenure, ownership concentration and ownership type) as the
independent variables and the level of corporate strategic change as the
dependent variable. Second, the interaction effect has been verified by
assuming the ownership type as a moderating variable.
In the analysis of the panel data, it is necessary to verify the validity
of the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem first. First, there
is a possibility that the collective organization-specific characteristics
and factors of state-owned firms, which are the subject of this study,
can cause the heterogeneity. Here, a fixed effect model is suitable for
controlling these characteristics effectively. If the heterogeneity is not
statistically related to the covariance in the population, the random
effect model is suitable. However, as a result of the Hausman test, it
could be concluded that it is appropriate to select the fixed effect model
because the estimator of the random effect model is not a coincident
estimator at the significance level of p < .01.
On the other hand, the autocorrelation problem, which is another
verification subject, refers to the case where the standard error value is
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biased in the fixed effect model. We have verified this by inputting the
"xtserial" command of STATA 13. As a result of the analysis, no
problem of autocorrelation was found. However, we have proposed a
robust standard error value to control heteroscedasticity in the process
(Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, the mean
centering process has been used as a method to reduce the possibility
of multicollinearity between variables and to increase the ease of
regression coefficients in performing a series of processes.
Ⅳ. Empirical Analysis Results
4.1 Basic Statistics and Correlation
This study covers a total of 270 state-owned enterprises. In
particular, the research hypothesis is based on the ownership type
classification of the state-owned enterprises which are classified into
106 state-owned share firms and 164 state-owned legal person share
firms. We have studied the relationship between each independent
variable and the dependent variable in the ownership type of each
state-owned enterprise. Table B1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
samples used in the study. With this information, it is possible to
identify the mean and standard deviation of each of the 270 total
samples over the nine years. It is possible to identify the group
differences between the direct state-owned firm group and the indirect
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state-owned firm group on the basis of the average value and the
standardization index of each variable. As shown in the table, all
variables except for the CEO succession type have a group difference
at the significance level of p <.01 or p <.05.
Table B2 shows the Pearson correlation values for the entire 270
state-owned enterprise samples. The results show that the level of
corporate strategic change, which is the dependent variable in this
study, has a significant correlation with the independent variables. In
addition, a multicollinearity test has been conducted to check whether
there is a high correlation between independent variables. As a result,
there is no problem with multicollinearity since the VIF values of all
variables are lower than 10 (Kennedy, 1998). Therefore, hypothesis
testing has been conducted with these variables.
----------------------------------
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4.2 Hypothesis Verification Results
Table B3 shows the empirical results of each variable affecting the
level of corporate strategic change. Model 1 shows the significance
between the control variables and the dependent variable assumed in
this study. First, variables such as the firm age, gross sales, the size
of the BOD and the age of the CEO have a significant relationship
with the level of corporate strategic change at the level of p < .01, and
the CEO’s succession type also have a significant relationship with the
level of corporate strategic change at the level of p < .05. On the
other hand, Model 2 shows the relationship with the dependent variable
as a result of adding each independent variable to the control variables
input in Model 1. Model 2 can be used to confirm the results of
Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 4 derived in the study. First, as suggested
in Hypothesis 1, it could be found that the positive (+) relationship
between the ratio of outside directors in the BOD and the level of
strategic change has a significant causal relationship at the level of P
< .01. In addition, as suggested in Hypothesis 2, it could also be
proven that the negative (-) relationship between the CEO’s tenure and
the corporate strategic change has a significant causal relationship at
the level of p < .05. As suggested in Hypothesis 3, the negative (-)
relationship between ownership concentration and the dependent
variable could also be adopted at the level of p < .01. Finally, as
suggested in Hypothesis 4, it could also be found that the positive (+)
relationship of state-owned shares and state-owned legal person shares
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(coded: indirect ownership type = 1) with the level of corporate
strategic change has a significant causal relationship at the level of p
< .05. As a result, all hypotheses postulating the relationship between
each independent variable and the dependent variable have been
accepted.
Models 3, 4, and 5 show the interaction effect of the ownership type
in the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent
variable. First, in Model 3, we have verified the interaction effect of
the ownership type of each state-owned firm in the positive (+)
relationship between the ratio of outside directors in the BOD and the
strategic change. We have confirmed that the assertion of Hypothesis 5
can be supported (Β = -0.203, p <.01). If we look closely, the
relationship between independent and dependent variables of a direct
state-owned firm is still positive (+) (β = 0.159, p <.01). In contrast,
the regression coefficient sign of the main effect is changed by the
interaction effect in the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables of an indirect state-owned firm. As shown in
Figure 2, the effect of outside directors is clearly observed in the direct
state-owned firm group while the effect in the indirect state-owned
firm group tends to decrease. Here, outside directors has a positive (+)
effect on the level of strategic change,
On the other hand, in Model 4, we have verified the interaction effect
of the ownership type of each state-owned enterprise in the negative
(-) relationship between the CEO's tenure and the level of strategic
change. The interaction effect has also been found to have a significant
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causal relationship at the level of p <.01 (β = 0.206). Likewise, the
main effect relationship of each direct state-owned firm have a
significant negative (-) effect (β = -0.087, p <.05) while it can be
inferred that the regression coefficient of the main effect of each
indirect state-owned firm has a positive (+) direction. Thus, Hypothesis
6 has also turned out to be supported. The interaction effect between
these variables can also be visualized as shown in Figure B3.
State-owned share firms have the same direction, where there is the
negative (-) effect between each independent variable and the
dependent variable. On the other hand, it can be observed that the
main effect of state-owned legal person share firms shows the opposite
direction due to the organizational characteristics claimed in the
hypothesis.
Finally, Model 5 verified the interaction effect of the ownership type
on the negative (-) relationship between the ownership concentration
and the level of strategic change. As a result, as claimed in Hypothesis
7, the interaction effect of each ownership type variable factor on the
relationship between two variables could be confirmed (β = 0.231, p <
.01 level). It can be known that the state-owned share firm has a
negative (-) relationship between each independent variable and the
dependent variable at the level of p < .01 (β = -0.180). On the other
hand, it can be observed that state-owned legal person share firms
show the opposite direction. According to the results, Hypothesis 7 has
also turned out to be adopted. This can be understood more clearly in
Figure B4. That is, while the hypothesis that the higher ownership
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concentration will lower the level of corporate strategic change is valid
for the state-owned share firm group, the state-owned legal person
share firm group shows an opposite directional relationship on the basis
of the logic of the hypothesis.
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Ⅴ. Discussions and Conclusions
In this study, we have focused on the empirical analysis of Chinese
state-owned enterprises regarding the causal relationship of the
corporate governance factors with the level of strategic change and the
interaction effect of the ownership type. This is because the
background and organizational characteristics of listed state-owned
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enterprises in China should be reflected in reality.
The results obtained through hypothesis testing have the following
implications.
First, we can expect the expansion of the research area related to the
level of strategic change by examining the causal relationship between
multiple corporate governance factors and the level of strategic change.
As mentioned above, governance factors affecting the level of strategic
change have concentrated on principal ‘management' agents, and there
have been no studies to identify the relationship between them in
Chinese listed enterprises. Therefore, this study can be considered to
have an academic meaning. Model 2 in Table B3 can be used to
identify the causal relationship of each variable. First, it can be
observed that the ratio of outside directors in the BOD has a positive
(+) relationship with the level of corporate strategic change. This
implies that the functions of outside directors such as services and
resources provide a positive influence on the strategic change of
state-owned enterprises. In addition, the CEO-related research
hypothesis, which has been most actively discussed in relation to the
level of strategic change, has also been adopted. As a result, we could
support previous studies’ assertion that they show a passive attitude
toward strategic change as their tenure gets longer (Shen, 2003; Staw
et al., 1981). The more interesting part is that the ownership
concentration and the ownership type have a significant relationship
with the level of strategic change. Here, the ownership concentration
and the ownership type are set in consideration of the national
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uniqueness and the uniqueness of Chinese state-owned enterprises. It
can be observed that there is a negative (-) relationship between the
concentration of government-related shares and the level of strategic
change. This is because the non-government-related block holders are
more interested in strategic change to improve the financial
performance than the government-related block holders as we have
assumed. This implies that the demand of non-government-related
block holders can act as a pressure for strategic choice in the
enterprise. The relationship between the ownership type and the level
of strategic change has also been supported. State-owned firms take a
passive attitude toward strategic change, since their organizational
characteristics emphasize public interest (Dong Sik Chang, 2008). In
contrast, state-owned legal person firms take a relatively aggressive
attitude toward strategic change since they are exposed to relatively
competitive industries and seek revenue maximization. In summary, we
have come to the conclusion that each corporate governance factor can
be considered as a major leading variable in corporate strategic change.
The second implication of this study is as follows. The ownership
type of the study subject has been classified into a state-owned firm
and a state-owned legal person firm, and the effect of these
enterprises’ corporate governance factors on corporate strategic change
has been verified. As stated in the Theoretical Background section,
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are divided into state-owned
firms and state-owned legal person firms, which have been developed
with different backgrounds and legal bases. Since 1992, there have been
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reforms related to the state-owned legal person firms in phases. Here,
state-owned firms are directly managed by the government, and the
government directly engages in their management. State-owned legal
person firms are indirectly owned by the government, but they operate
their enterprise independently. It is our discretion that the
characteristics of the state-owned legal person firm have been divided.
Hence, we could set the hypothesis that these characteristics would
affect the main effect relationship.
Model 3 in Table B3 shows the interaction effect of the ownership
type in the relationship between the ratio of outside directors and the
level of strategic change. The positive (+) effect of outside directors,
which affects the level of strategic change in a state-owned firm, is
greater. Figure B2 illustrates these results in more detail. In the
state-owned firm group, the level of strategic change gets higher as
the ratio of outside directors gets higher. On the other hand, in the
case of the state-owned legal person firm group, the level of strategic
change tends to decrease as the ratio of outside directors increases.
This indicates practical implications that the composition of the BOD
can depend on the ownership type in the strategic change and choice
of a state-owned firm. In contrast, Model 4 in Table B3 shows the
relationship between the CEO's tenure and the level of strategic change
according to the ownership type. Hypothesis 2 verifies that there is a
negative (-) relationship between the CEO's tenure and the level of
strategic change. The relationship has been confirmed to be a
significant difference between the state-owned firm group and the
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state-owned legal person firm group. This is illustrated in more detail
in Figure B3. In the case of the state-owned corporation group, the
ratio of strategic change rather increases even though the tenure of the
CEO increases. On the other hand, in state-owned shares, the level of
strategic change also decreases as the tenure of the CEO increases, as
assumed in the main effect relationship. This result can be interpreted
as a result of the organizational characteristics and the industrial
environment of each group. In the case of the state-owned legal person
firm group, it can be seen that the enterprise is exposed to a
competitive environment with a performance-oriented organizational
structure. Finally, Model 5 of Table B3 can be used to confirm the
interaction effect between the ownership concentration and the
ownership type with relation to the level of strategic change. In the
end, it is logical to assume that the concentration of
non-government-related shares determines the attitude of the
organization to strategic change and its characteristics may vary
according to each group. Figure B4 shows the relationship between the
ownership concentration of the government and the level of strategic
change in each group. In the state-owned firm group, the level of
strategic change decreases as the concentration of the
government-related shares increases. In the state-owned legal person
firm group, the level of strategic change increases as the ownership
concentration of the government increases. The results are as follows:
1) In the case of the state-owned legal person firm group, the
ownership and the management are separated due to the nature of the
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corporate group, and the independence of the business management of
the enterprise is ensured. Therefore, the executives can be less
burdened when choosing strategy changes even though the
government-related share is high, 2) The high concentration of
government-related shares stabilizes corporate governance and gives
investors confidence that they can eventually lead to aggressive
strategic change.
----------------------------------
Table B4 is about here
----------------------------------
In addition, we have not postulated the ownership type as an
independent and moderating variable. Instead, in order to check the
causal relationship in each group, we have verified the significance
between each independent variable and the dependent variable in the
state-owned firm group and in state-owned legal person firm group
respectively as shown in Table B4. Models 2 and 3 can be used to
determine the significance of directionality and the relationship between
each independent variable and the dependent variable in each group.
The ratio of outside directors (+), the CEO's tenure (-) and ownership
concentration (-) have been verified in the whole groups at the level of
p < .01, but all of these variables have shown a significant opposite
directional relationship in the state-owned legal person firm group. On
the other hand, in the state-owned firm group, all these variables have
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shown the same directional relationship as the hypotheses about the
whole groups, and the relationship has turned out to be significant. It
can be interpreted that the different effect and directionality of each
group support the moderation effect of the ownership type in the
relationship between each governance factor and the level of strategic
change as identified in Figure B1, B2 and B3.
The implications discussed above may be regarded as differentiating
characteristics of this study, but it also contains limitations. First, there
are limitations in the data collection and analysis process. In the study,
nine-year panel data collected from 2007 to 2014 and from 2008 to
2015 have been used for the independent variables and the dependent
variable respectively, except for those enterprises that were not able to
pursue a 9-year follow-up survey to analyze the balance panel data.
Finally, only a total of 270 enterprises were sampled. In the future,
there is a need for a study on more enterprises. In addition, since there
are only a limited number of manufacturing companies supporting all
variables necessary for the research, and only a limited number of
listed companies have been sampled. Therefore, there may be a
problem of whether these characteristics represent the entire
state-owned enterprises.
Second, in this study, the ownership type is used to distinguish
between state-owned firms and state-owned legal person firms, but
there have been only a few studies that use such criteria to classify
Chinese state-owned enterprises (e.g., Hu, Tam & Tan, 2010). There is
also another study on ownership type differentiation. Although in this
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study we have classified the characteristics of the state-owned firm
group and state-owned legal person firm group on the basis of
historical and institutional backgrounds, more valid grounds are needed.
Third, in this study, various variables considered to affect the level
of strategic change have been used as control variables. However, this
study still has the following limitations: we have not controlled the
additional factors that could influence the dependent variable. For
example, in the case of a CEO or a BOD, their demographic and
statistical characteristics can influence corporate strategic change
(Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014; Musteen, Barket & Baeten, 2006).
Therefore, more precise research reflecting such a point should be
conducted in the future.
Finally, in this study, we have used the following factors as proxy
variables for the ownership type and principal management agents in
corporate governance affecting the level of strategic change: the ratio
of outside directors in the BOD, the CEO's tenure, the ownership
concentration and the ownership type. However, there are limitations to
these since there are various proxy variables that can show the
characteristics of each management agent.
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[Table B1] Descriptive Statistics
a.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. state-owned share state-owned legal person share
Rank-sum Z for the 
difference
Strategic Change 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 12.941***
firm age(t-1) 14.217 4.933 14.931 13.738 5.530***
firm size(t-1) 23.592 2.475 23.868 23.408 2.334**
sales(t-1) 21.795 2.112 21.009 22.307 11.466***
performance (t-1) 0.225 2.604 0.271 0.343 4.816***
board size(t-1) 9.790 2.442 9.187 10.178 7.572***
CEO succession(t-1) 0.047 0.212 0.050 0.045 1.219 
CEO age(t-1) 48.260 5.616 49.461 46.436 -11.551***
ownership concentration 0.613 0.181 0.721 0.565 -16.817***
outside directors 0.371 0.059 0.374 0.369 2.769**
CEO tenure 4.428 3.154 5.072 4.015 5.691***
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[Table B2] Correlation Matrix
a.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (양측검정)
　 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Strategic 
Change 1
firm age(t-1) 0.058*** 1
firm size(t-1) 0.007 0.061*** 1
sales(t-1) -0.258*** -0.106*** -0.002 1
performance(t-1) -0.014 -0.033 -0.055** 0.196*** 1
board size(t-1) -0.061*** -0.135*** -0.031 0.230*** 0.051** 1
CEO age(t-1) -0.109*** 0.047** -0.072*** 0.243*** 0.043** 0.107*** 1
CEO 
succession(t-1) -0.003 0.030 0.001 -0.053*** -0.016 -0.077*** 0.091*** 1
ownership type -0.113*** -0.123*** 0.007 0.313*** 0.058*** 0.207*** 0.250*** -0.113*** 1
ownership 
concentration -0.105*** -0.058*** -0.093*** 0.200*** 0.033 0.170*** 0.191*** -0.105*** 0.334*** 1
outside directors 0.068*** -0.074*** -0.026 0.067*** 0.013 -0.255*** 0.091*** 0.068*** -0.035* -0.046** 1
CEO tenure -0.033 0.127*** -0.012 0.079*** -0.016 0.010 0.163*** -0.033 -0.158*** -0.093*** 0.058***
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[Table B3] The fixed-effects panel estimates for governance factors
toward strategic change
 a. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 b. years, industry, dummies are included but not reported
























































































































H4 X H1 -0.203***(0.060)
















Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430
Number of firms 270 270 270 270 270
R-squared 0.131 0.167 0.174 0.186 0.171
F statistic 14.03 15.46 15.64 16.99 15.38
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[Table B4] The fixed-effects panel estimates for governance factors toward
strategic change each group
a. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b. years, industry, dummies are included but not reported




















































































R-squared 0.147 0.274 0.294
F statistic 13.79 11.900 21.19
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[Figure B1] Comparing state-owned share to state-owned legal person share
[Figure B2] The moderating effect of ownership type on the link between
outside director ratio and strategic change
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[Figure B3] The moderating effect of ownership type on the link between
CEO tenure and strategic change
[Figure B4] The moderating effect of ownership type on the link between
ownership concentration and strategic change
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General Conclusion
This study focused on empirically analyzing the effects of corporate
governance factors on the financial performance and strategic change of
Chinese enterprises. In this process, we have attempted to fill the
limitations of the previous studies in assuming governance factors. The
reason for this is that the moderation effect will vary depending on the
ownership type operationally defined in each study.
Let's summarize the results of each study. First, in Study 1, we have
postulated the following characteristics of principal ‘management' agents
(BOD and CEO) as independent variables among corporate governance
variables: the ratio of outside directors in the BOD, the ration of directors
with political connections in the BOD, the CEO's tenure, and the CEO's
political connection. We have examined the causal relationship between
these characteristics and the financial performance of the enterprise. The
ownership type can be used to distinguish whether an enterprise is a
state-owned firm or a private-owned firm. We have also postulated
ownership type as an independent variable to verify the effect of this
ownership type on the causal relationship between each independent
variable and the dependent variable. As a result of the empirical analysis,
it is found that all factors except the political connections of the BOD
among the four independent variables postulated in the study have a
significant relationship with the financial performance. In addition, the
interaction effect of the ownership type has a significant moderation effect
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on all hypotheses except the ones related to the political connections of the
BOD. These results have the following implications: 1) We have provided
longitudinal verification results in the relationship between financial
performance and governance variables that have not been consistent. 2) We
have examined the causal relationship between the characteristics of
principal ‘management' agents and the financial performance. 3) We have
shown the collective characteristics of listed enterprises in China by
revealing the moderation effect according to the given ownership type.
In Study 2, among corporate governance factors, the ratio of outside
directors in the BOD and the CEO's tenure represents the characteristics
of principal ‘management' agents, and the ownership concentration and
ownership type indicates the characteristics of an 'ownership' holder. We
have postulated these characteristics as independent variables to identify
the causal relationship between them and strategic change. In addition, we
have redefined the ownership type of a state-owned firm as a moderating
variable to identify its effect on the causal relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variable. According to the results
of the empirical analysis, all four independent variables postulated in the
study have a significant relationship with the dependent variable, and the
interaction effect of the ownership type of state-owned firm is also
supported in all hypotheses. The results have the following implications. 1)
We have extended the study of the relationship between corporate
governance and strategic change by identifying the causal relationship
between each 'ownership' holder’s characteristics as well as each
'management' body’s characteristics which have been concentrated so far.
- 129 -
2) We have classified the ownership type into a state-owned firm and a
state-owned legal person firm, and it has been found that this type has
the interaction effect on the relationship between each corporate governance
factor and the level of corporate strategic change.
Of course, the following problems can be raised during the verification
process: 1) limitations on sampling and methodology, and 2) validity in the
process of postulating variables considering environmental uniqueness.
However, it can be said that this study has academic significance due to
the following reasons: we have filled the academic gap that has been
presented in the study of Chinese enterprises regarding corporate
governance. We have explained the causal relationship between variables
through a behavioral and structural approach.
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국문 초록
중국의 기업을 중심으로 기업지배구조가 기업의




기업지배구조(corporate governance)는 현대 전략경영연구에 있어 주요한
연구 주제로 자리 잡아왔다. ‘소유’와 ‘경영’의 특수한 관계가 야기하는 대리인
문제(agency problem)를 해결하기 위한 과정에서 출현한 ‘기업지배구조’ 개념
은 대리인 이론(agency theory), 청지기 이론(stewardship theory) 등 지배구
조 주체의 태도와 특성에 근거한 통제 메커니즘, 각종 기업 성과 변수들과 가
지는 인과관계 규명 등 광범위하고 폭넓은 연구 영역을 구축하고 있다. 특히,
20세기 말부터 시작된 세계화와 자유무역주의의 확산은 각 국가 및 기업들에
게 국제적 표준의 기업지배구조 형성에 관한 당위성을 높임으로써 지배구조
개선과 관련한 움직임을 촉발시키는 계기가 되었다.
이 같은 흐름에서 중국 역시 예외일 수 없다. 중국 기업들의 영향력이 증가
함에 따라 국제적 표준에 규합하는 지배구조 개선이 중요한 과제로 부각되었
고 결국 정부 주도의 단계적 제도 개선이 요구되었던 것이다. 이에 중국 정부
는 1999년 9월 중국 공산당 15차 중앙위원회 회의에서 증권시장 양대 기본법
인 <회사법>과 <증권법> 개정을 시작으로, 2006년 말 ‘비유통주의 유통화 개
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혁(equity division reform)'을 마무리 짐으로써 정부 중심 ’소유-경영‘ 일원적
구조를 분리시키고 국제적 표준에 근접한 제도적 기반을 마련하게 되었다.
따라서 연구자는 ‘유통화 개혁’이 중국 상장 기업들의 지배구조 체질 개선에
있어 중대한 영향을 미쳤음을 전제로, 연구를 진행함에 있어 개혁 이후 중국
기업들에서 관찰되는 지배구조 특성과 기업의 성과 및 전략 변수와의 인과
관계를 검증하는데 초점을 맞추었다. 먼저, study 1의 경우 기업의 ‘경영’ 주체
가 가지는 특성이 기업의 재무적 성과와 가지는 관계를 살폈다. 지배구조 안
정화 시점에 접어든 2007년부터 2015년까지의 중국 내 상장된 공기업
(state-owned firm) 및 사기업(private-owned firm)을 표본으로 하고 기업지
배구조 변수 중 핵심적 ‘경영’ 주체로 판단될 수 있는 이사회와 최고경영자의
특성을 독립변수로 상정하여 이것이 재무적 성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하였
다. 그간 중국 내 기업들을 대상으로 진행된 연구들은 지배구조 상의 ‘경영’
주체와 재무적 성과와의 종단적 관계 규명이 미비했던 만큼 이 같은 간극을
채우기 위한 시도가 주도적으로 이뤄졌음을 밝힌다. 더하여 ‘정치적 연관성
(political connection)’을 경영 주체의 주요한 특성 중 하나로 상정하고 종속변
수와의 인과 관계를 살핌으로써 연구의 차별성을 높이는데 주력하였다.
study 2는 연구 대상을 중국 내 상장 공기업만으로 하되 법적, 제도적 근거
를 가지고 이를 유형화(국가주와 국유법인주로 구분함)하여 지배구조 특성과
전략변화도가 가지는 인과 관계에 대해 규명하였다. 연구를 진행함에 있어 지
금까지 중국 기업들을 대상으로 기업지배구조와 전략변화도가 가지는 관계를
실증 분석한 연구가 매우 미흡했던 점, 그 범위를 중국 외로 확대하더라도 지
배구조 요인이 ‘경영’ 주체에 집중되어 있어 ‘소유’ 주체의 특성 역시 고려되어
이것들과 전략변화도와 관계를 규명한 연구가 필요하다는 점 등이 고려되었
다. 상하이증권거래소에 상장되어 있는 공기업들 중 2007년부터 2015년까지
총 9년간 관찰 가능한 270개의 기업이 최종적으로 확정되었으며 이를 고정효
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과모형(fixed effect model)으로 분석하였다.
이상의 study 1, 2는 기존 계약론적 관점으로 기업지배구조 요인과 기업 성
과 및 전략 간의 인과 관계를 분석하는 동시에 지배구조 주체들에 대한 행태
적 접근, 중국 기업들이 배태 되어 있는 제도적 환경적 특수성 등이 고려되었
다는 점에서 시사점을 가진다고 판단된다.
Key words : 기업지배구조, 재무적 성과, 전략적 변화
학 번: 2012-31274
